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THE WORLD BANK AND JUDICIAL REFORM:
OVERCOMING “BLIND SPOTS” IN THE
APPROACH TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
ROBERTO LAVER*
INTRODUCTION
In his book The Rule of Law, the late Lord Tom Bingham makes it
clear that the principle of “rule of law does not import unqualified
admiration of the law,” judges, or lawyers.1 However, as the author rightly
adds, one would rather live in a country that respects such a principle than
one which does not. Generally speaking, the rule of law means that all
persons are bound by the law and no one is above the law. And, as the
eminent jurist points out and most would agree, an independent judiciary is
fundamental to the rule of law. Such independence is not limited to the
political branches of government; it also extends to any particular
individual or group. Yet, given their potential power and interests, it is
most important for judges to be free from interference by the executive and
legislative authorities.
Unfortunately, most people do not enjoy the blessings of the rule of
law. They live in countries where the image of Lady Justice, wearing her
blindfold, is simply that—an image far removed from reality—her
blindfold often removed or not there to begin with. Impartial justice is rare:
seldom dispensed without fear or favor and regardless of money or power.
In many settings, there is a cultural disregard for the rule of law and values
of independence and impartiality. An illustration of this grim reality is
depicted in the New York Times series “Above the Law,” the winner of the
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most recent Pulitzer Prize for international reporting.2 This series of
journalistic materials, produced by Ellen Barry and Clifford Levy, shows
widespread abuse of power in Russia’s justice system and violence against
rights and opposition activists, jurors, and journalists.3 They clearly
demonstrate a culture of impunity with no respect for the rule of law,
judicial independence or impartiality.4 Constitutional safeguards to ensure
judicial independence exist, but they do not work in practice.
Examples of pervasive government abuse such as this abound
worldwide. Their devastating effects on society make it clear why building
the rule of law and functioning judiciaries has become a central concern of
the international development community. The World Bank (“the Bank”),
arguably the premier development institution, recognizes that countries
with weak legal and judicial systems are economically and socially
impaired.5 For about two decades, the Bank has been a key player in
helping to strengthen judiciaries in developing countries, providing
significant financial and technical assistance for justice reform. As of its
last compendium, issued in 2009, the Bank’s justice sector assistance and
reform portfolio comprised nearly 2,500 justice reform activities in
developing or transition countries.6 These activities take many operational
forms and span all Bank operational instruments: including loans or credits,
grants, technical assistance, and research. Central to this portfolio are the
“stand-alone” operations, those lending operations that take justice sector
institutions as their primary focus.
This Article analyzes the manner in which the Bank evaluates and
addresses judicial independence in its portfolio of stand-alone operations. It
focuses particularly on the independence of judges from political power. It
shows that the Bank fails to evaluate political interference in the judicial
process in a coherent, consistent and comprehensive manner and to address
the underlying cultural forces. Section I describes the legal basis for the
Bank’s engagement in judicial reform and reviews the development of the
Bank’s thinking and strategy. Its emphasis is on how such strategy affirms
2. See The 2011 Pulitzer Prize Winners: International Reporting, THE PULITZER PRIZES,
http://www.pulitzer.org/citation/2011-International-Reporting (last visited May 18, 2011).
3. E.g., Clifford J. Levy, Russian Journalists, Fighting Graft, Pay in Blood, N.Y. TIMES, May
17, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/world/europe/18impunity.html.
4. See id.
5. The World Bank is composed of two unique development institutions, the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development
Association (IDA). The IBRD focuses on middle-income countries and creditworthy poor
countries while IDA focuses on the poorest countries in the world. IBRD provides lowinterest loans and IDA provides interest-free credits and grants to developing countries.
WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, at 1 n.5 (2009).
6. Id. at 4.
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the strategic significance and centrality of judicial independence to judicial
reform efforts. The Article then moves from the Bank’s strategy to its
practice. Section II comprehensively examines the Bank’s portfolio of
stand-alone operations, analyzing how the Bank addresses judicial
independence in such projects in light of its strategy. It examines to what
extent the problem of political interference in the judicial process informs
and shapes the Bank’s assistance for judicial reforms. Finally, Section III
makes recommendations for better assessing true political commitment to
judicial independence and deepening the focus on the relationship between
judicial independence and culture.
I. JUDICIAL REFORM: MANDATE AND STRATEGY
The foray into judicial reform activities by the Bank required serious
consideration of its mandate to pursue these aims. The Bank is not free to
pursue any activity it wishes; the respective activity must fall within its
economic development mandate as interpreted by the appropriate bodies.7
For judicial reform, this act of interpretation took place as the Bank defined
the boundaries for its engagement with governance issues. Discussion of
the context and details of the Bank’s legal rationale for judicial reform
assistance follows.
A. The Bank Charter and Judicial Reform
Scholars and development practitioners widely accept that a sound
judicial system, as an essential element of the rule of law, is key to a
country’s political, economic, and social development.8 A well functioning
judicial system is required to stimulate investment, both domestically and

7. The legal mandates of the World Bank are found in the respective IBRD and IDA Charters or
Articles of Agreement. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development art. I, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter IBRD Articles of
Agreement] (stating the IBRD’s purposes to “assist in the reconstruction and development of territories
of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes,” to “promote private
foreign investment,” and to “promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the
maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments . . . thereby assisting in raising productivity, the
standard of living and conditions of labor in [members’] territories”); Articles of Agreement of the
International Development Association art. I, Jan. 26, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249
[hereinafter IDA Articles of Agreement] (stating the IDA’s purposes “to promote economic
development, increase productivity and thus raise standards of living in the less-developed areas of the
world”) available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,content
MDK:20052360~menuPK:115747~pagePK:83988~piPK:84004~theSitePK:73154,00.html.
8. For a survey of this scholarship, see Richard Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic
Development: A Survey of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 120-23 (1999).
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from abroad.9 Indeed, private investors seek a judical system that protects
property and contractual rights, and adjudicates disputes without
capriciousness or undue outside influence.10 Further, fair and impartial
judges protect the civil and political rights of citizens such as freedom of
speech, association, and religion. Judiciaries that are institutionally weak,
subject to corruption, and heavily politicized cannot fulfill these vital
roles.11
While an effective judicial system is important in the developed
world, it is perhaps even more critical in countries where democracy is
fresh and the need to institutionalize the rule of law is essential for
development. In the past two decades, many developing countries have
made the transition from authoritarian rule to a democratic form of
governance. In many such transitions, “victims of human rights abuses . . .
have demanded that [their offenders] be brought to justice.”12 These shifts
to democracy also brought with them a need for a judicial system that can
effectively establish confidence in government institutions and practices,
and governments have also quickly realized that their economic

9. See id. For additional World Bank sources on the relationship between functioning judicial
institutions and economic and social development, see ANA PALACIO, WORLD BANK, LEGAL
EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR: AN ACTION AGENDA FOR THE WORLD BANK, 2005-2006 (World Bank
Working Paper No. 48701); WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990S: LEARNING FROM A
DECADE OF REFORM (2005); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING
INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS (2002); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996: FROM
PLAN TO MARKET (1996).
10. IBRAHIM SHIHATA, 2 THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 149-50 (2000).
11. The World Bank produces empirical evidence showing the relationship between a sound
justice sector and development. This includes cross-country data sets that demonstrate a correlation
between deficiencies in the rule of law and negative economic and social development. See IDA
Resource Allocation Index (IRAI), WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/S2THWI1X60 (last visited
Oct. 31, 2011); World Bank Institute, Governance & Anti-Corruption, WORLD BANK, http://
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). Doing Business Reports—a
publication by The International Finance Corporation (IFC)—provide a quantitative measure for
comparing business regulations in ten indicator sets across 181 countries. Doing Business has found
that streamlined court processes and faster contract enforcement are associated with a better
environment for business. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2004: UNDERSTANDING
REGULATIONS 41-42 (2003). The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS)—developed jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development—comprises surveys of over 4,000 firms in 22 transition countries in the Europe and
Central Asia Region. The findings of these surveys indicate that firms identify critical obstacles to their
effective functioning as crime, complex regulations, and judicial performance among others. See
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/
data-catalog/BEEPS.
12. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & VENEZUELAN PROGRAM FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS EDUCATION AND ACTION, HALFWAY TO REFORM: THE WORLD BANK AND THE VENEZUELAN
JUSTICE SYSTEM 18 (1996) [hereinafter HALFWAY TO REFORM].
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development is inextricably linked to an efficient judicial system that can
impartially resolve commercial disputes.13
In varying degrees, judiciaries in developing and transition countries
remain unprepared to respond to these challenges. Judicial systems are
choked with inefficient procedures that cause unreasonable delays, and
undermine the courts’ ability to enforce judgments.14 Often, they are
heavily influenced by (or under the direct control of) the executive or
legislative branch, thus making it very improbable that a private litigant
will receive a fair trial against the government.15 Corruption, along with a
lack of transparency and predictability in court decisions, undermines
public trust.16 Other barriers to access to justice include excessive court
fees, overburdened and inaccessible courthouses, biased judges, and
cumbersome procedural requirements.17 In addition, judges inexperienced
in commercial law can leave a country with a body of weak and
inconsistent jurisprudence.18
In an effort to deal with these problems, governments in developing
and transition countries have taken steps to reform their respective judicial
systems. Many of these initiatives are supported by the international donor
community. The Bank has engaged in judicial reform operations since the
early 1990s as a result of the gradual expansion of its mandate and its thenemerging governance agenda.19
The concept of governance emerged out of the Bank’s experience with
its own portfolio. By the late 1980s, it became clear that the Bank’s
structural adjustment programs were not producing the expected results in
13. Id.
14. See id. at 19.
15. Id. ; SHIHATA, supra note 10, at 151.
16. HALFWAY TO REFORM, supra note 12, at 19-20.
17. See id.
18. See SHIHATA, supra note 10, at 151 (pointing to the problem of judicial inexperience in
applying new legislation).
19. Initially, the World Bank adopted a narrow interpretation of development as exclusively
economic growth. Correspondingly, “economic considerations” encompassed “only those issues that
were directly relevant to the financial and technical feasibility of the projects it was funding and to the
project’s impact on the economic growth potential of the Member State.” Daniel D. Bradlow, The
World Bank, the IMF and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 55 (1996) (citing
United Nations, Statements of U.N. Legal Counsel and IBRD General Counsel on Relations of U.N.
and IBRD and Effect of U.N. Resolutions, 6 I.L.M. 150 (1967)). However, as notions of development
have evolved and international political circumstances have changed, the World Bank’s interpretation
of its mandate has expanded. Beginning in the 1960s, the World Bank’s scope expanded to a broader
focus on poverty alleviation and sustainable development including new areas of lending such as rural
development, human resources development (e.g., health, education) the environment, and structural
reforms. See PAUL MOSLEY ET. AL., 1 AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK AND POLICY BASED
LENDING 21-23 (1991).
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many countries. In evaluating the poor performance of its policy-based
lending in Sub-Saharan Africa, a landmark Bank study in 1989 attributed
this situation to a “crisis in governance.”20 This study defined governance
as “the exercise of political power to manage a nations’ affairs” including
elements such as accountability of leaders to their peoples, transparency of
transactions, proper administration of public funds, respect for due process
and human rights, protection of the freedom of press, and independence of
the judiciary.21
The 1989 study proved to be a stimulus for debate in the Bank on the
relationship between governance and its mandate.22 In 1990, the General
Counsel of the Bank issued a legal opinion on the legitimacy of its
involvement in judicial reform.23 Under its Charter, the Bank is precluded
from “interfer[ing] in the political affairs” of its member countries or taking
into account anything other than “economic considerations” in its lending
operations.24 In his 1990 legal opinion the General Counsel concluded that
the Bank “may favorably respond to a country’s request for assistance in
the field of legal reform, including judicial reform, if it finds it relevant to
the country’s economic development and to the success of the Bank’s
lending strategy for the country.”25
While the political neutrality aspect of its mandate did not prevent the
Bank’s entry into judicial reform activities, the scope and conditions of its
participation were unclear. At the time, according to the General Counsel,
the Bank’s charter only permitted Bank-financed judicial reform projects
that have “direct and obvious” implications for economic development.26 In
20. WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA-FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, A LONG
TERM PERSPECTIVE STUDY 60 (1989).
21. Id. at 15, 22, 60-61, 192.
22. WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 5 (1992).
23. Memorandum of the Vice President and General Counsel of IBRD, Issues of “Governance”
in the Borrowing Members—The Extent of Their Relevance Under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement
(Dec. 21, 1990).
24. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 7, art. IV, sec. 10; accord IDA Articles of
Agreement, supra note 7, art. V, sec. 6; Articles of Agreement of the International Financial
Corporation art. III, sec. 9, opened for signature May 25, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197, 264 U.N.T.S. 117
[hereinafter IFC Articles of Agreement]; see also Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency art, 34, Oct. 11, 1985, T.I.A.S. 12089, 1508 U.N.T.S. 99 [hereinafter MIGA
Convention] (prohibiting decisions to be influenced “by the political character of the member or
members concerned”).
25. HALFWAY TO REFORM, supra note 12, at 25 (citing Ibrahim Shihata, Judicial Reform in
Developing Countries and the Role of the World Bank, in WORLD BANK, JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORLD BANK CONFERENCE 226 (1995)).
26. Id. (quoting Memorandum of Vice President and General Counsel, Issues of “Governance” in
the Borrowing Members: The Extent of Their Relevance Under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement 38
(Dec. 21, 1990)). Many groups, including the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, have criticized
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practical terms, such criteria were generally taken to mean that the Bank
should focus on the business and commercial side of the court system;
criminal justice was outside of the Bank’s mandate.27 This interpretation
failed to reflect the interrelation of the different parts of the judiciary
system. And in addition to this issue of scope, there was no clear guidance
on the nature of the reforms to be concerned with. Support for
administrative improvements such as statistics and court records would be
relatively simple and uncontroversial compared to projects that might
evaluate and implement measures directly affecting the balance of powers
between branches of government. It remained unclear whether the Bank
was legally permitted to address sensitive issues of judicial independence,
and how far it could go if in fact it was permitted. These issues, however,
became clearer as the Bank gained project experience and further
developed its thinking and strategy.
B. The Bank’s Strategic Directions on Judicial Reform
The first stand-alone project, the Venezuela Judicial Infrastructure
project, was approved by the Bank’s board of directors shortly after the
institution decided on the legitimacy issue as previously discussed.28 This
may explain in part the narrow focus of this initial operation. The Bank had
no clear strategic directions for its lending activities in the justice sector. It
only addressed the administrative and technical aspects of the judicial
system,29 concentrating its early lending on highly technical issues such as
capacity building, streamlining management systems, conducting training
programs, and improvement of physical infrastructure.30
This first project in Venezuela met with significant criticism both
within and outside the Bank. Internally, some advocated for a deeper sector
analysis prior to the identification and preparation of any specific project.
Externally, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Venezuelan
Program for Human Rights Education (PROVEA) conducted a

the World Bank for this interpretation, stating that it arbitrarily rejects projects that seek to reform
criminal codes, train police or criminal court judges or manage penal institutions. Similarly, they argue
that projects aimed at constitutional reform are likewise denied. By focusing solely on economic
consequences of judicial reform, these groups contend that World Bank reform projects fail to address
more fundamental, albeit political, issues, such as against alleged human rights abuses.
27. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BUILDING ON QUICKSAND: THE COLLAPSE OF
THE WORLD BANK’S JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT IN PERU 2-3 (2000) [hereinafter BUILDING ON
QUICKSAND].
28. World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report, Venezuela Judicial Infrastructure Project, at 11, Report
No. 10635 (July 15, 1992) [hereinafter Staff Appraisal Report: Venezuela 1992].
29. See HALFWAY TO REFORM, supra note 12, at 25-26.
30. BUILDING ON QUICKSAND, supra note 27, at 2-3.
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comprehensive study of the project.31 Issued during the project’s
implementation, the study found several problems including a lack of broad
government commitment to reform, failure to address “crucial structural
impediments to reform,” failure to address access to justice concerns, and a
lack of broad-based participation.32 The Bank also failed to gauge the level
of government commitment to the project prior to implementation. Instead,
as the Lawyers Committee contends, the Bank “assumed that a successful
Project would generate a commitment to further reform on the part of the
judiciary and serve as an example to the legislative and executive
[branches].”33
Experience with the Venezuela project prompted a great deal of
rethinking and analysis within the Bank. By the mid-1990s, the institution,
through official documents and publications of its then General Counsel
and other staff, recognized the need to adopt a more comprehensive
approach in its justice sector operations. It also affirmed the centrality of
judicial independence, government commitment, and broad-based public
participation to effective and sustainable judicial reform. Publications of
both the Bank itself and those of individual Bank officials repeatedly
identified several crucial issues to be addressed in its judicial reform
programs: judicial administration, procedural codes, access to justice, legal
education and training, and judicial independence (actual independence and
as perceived in the community).34 The issue of judicial independence thus
became central to judicial reform.
In a 1996 report, the Bank identified judicial independence as an
“imperative feature of any judicial reform project.”35 In a separate piece, a
Bank judicial reform specialist asserted that “efforts to promote judicial
independence are . . . at the heart of insuring judicial reform.”36 As
articulated by the then General Counsel, the core function of the judicial
system encompasses three principal elements: (1) a well-functioning
judiciary in which judges apply the law in a fair, even, and predictable
manner without undue delays or unaffordable costs; (2) rules interpreted
31. HALFWAY TO REFORM, supra note 12, at 12.
32. Id. at 21.
33. Id. at 102.
34. See SHIHATA, supra note 10; Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience
in Latin America, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 167 (1995); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Judicial Reform in Developing
Countries and the Role of the World Bank, in WORLD BANK, JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORLD BANK CONFERENCE 220-26 (1995).
35. BUILDING ON QUICKSAND, supra note 27, at 3 (citing MARIA DAKOLIAS, THE JUDICIAL
SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ELEMENTS OF REFORM 7 (1996) (World Bank
Technical Paper No. 319)).
36. Dakolias, supra note 34, at 172.
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and applied according to established procedures; and (3) an independent
body to resolve disputes.37
In early 2003, the Bank outlined a strategic framework and
methodology for designing and preparing legal and judicial activities.38 The
strategy reaffirmed and further developed the centrality of judicial
independence to the rule of law and judicial reform. The Bank noted that
judicial independence “has two functions: one is to limit government power
and the other is to protect the rights of individuals.”39 It further added that
“a truly independent judiciary is one that issues decisions and makes
judgments that are respected and enforced by the legislative and executive
branches; that receives an adequate appropriation from the legislature; and
that is not compromised by political attempts to undermine its
impartiality.”40 Thus the Bank’s definition of judicial independence
included both individual and institutional elements. In this respect,
Individual independence (decisional independence) is both substantive,
in that it allows judges to perform the judicial function subject to no
authority but the law, and personal, in that it guarantees judges job
tenure, adequate compensation and security. Institutional independence
affects the operation of the judiciary and adequate resources are an
important aspect of this.41

37. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Legal Framework for Development: The World Bank’s Role in Legal
and Judicial Reform, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, PROCEEDINGS OF
A WORLD BANK CONFERENCE 14 (1995).
38. WORLD BANK, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM: STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS 55-63 (2003) (World
Bank Working Paper No. 26916) [hereinafter STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS].
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 26. In dealing with judicial independence, the strategy reflects accepted international
principles and standards. See Seventh United Nations Conference on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1 at 59 (Sept. 6, 1985) [hereinafter United Nations Basic Principles]; Council of
Europe, European Charter on the Statute for Judges (Jul. 10, 1998); International Bar Association, IBA
Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence (1982); American Bar Association, Principles on
Judicial Independence and Fair and Impartial Courts, (Aug. 2007); Shimon Shetreet, Mount Scopus
Approved Revised International Standards of Judicial Independence (Mar. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Mount
Scopus Standards]. Because no widespread agreement on a concrete definition of “judicial
independence” exists, most attempts to define the term consist of lists of factors, which fall into two
categories of independence: Institutional and Decisional. E.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY,
i–ii (1997); See also American Bar Association Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, Justice in
Jeopardy 8 (2003); Brian K. Landsberg, The Role of Judicial Independence, 16 MCGEORGE GLOBAL
BUS. & DEV. L.J. 331, 347 (2006).
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The report recognized that economic growth and poverty reduction
can be neither sustainable nor equitable without the rule of law.42 It then
stressed that the rule of law “is built on the cornerstone of an independent,
efficient, and effective judicial system.”43 In fact, the first pillar of the
Bank’s new legal and judicial reform strategy was judicial independence.44
As the Bank affirmed, “First and foremost, the judiciary must be
independent, impartial, and effective.”45 Creating an institution with these
qualities “is particularly challenging in countries where the executive
branch views the judiciary as its instrument for political goals.”46 Thus,
since legal reform cannot succeed without an independent judicial system,
the Bank announced that it would direct its efforts in judicial reform at
“enhancing independence and increasing efficiency and equity in resolving
disputes by improving access to justice that is not rationed, and by
promoting private sector development.”47
The 2003 strategy document additionally argued that judicial integrity
of individual judges is also critical to judicial independence. Indeed, “The
essence of an independent and impartial judge lies in his or her personal
integrity,” and “[j]udicial independence can operate properly only when
judges are trained in the law and make decisions with integrity and
impartiality as guardians of public trust.”48 In this respect, the report noted
that judicial training, a common element in legal and judicial reform, not
only hinges on improving knowledge “but also changing attitudes.”49 This
change “is the most difficult area of education in any field,” but “it is the
essence of reform.”50 For example, judicial training programs may concern
skills or awareness building designed to help improve judicial integrity or
reduce judicial bias in fact finding, both of which can especially concern
issues of gender and ethnicity.51
Public trust and accountability also relate to judicial independence. As
the report explained, “Externally, public confidence is essential to maintain
an independent judiciary that enforces the law.”52 In addition, public trust is

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS, supra note 38, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 3, 28.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 26.
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necessary to enforce judgments even against the executive branch and to
prosecute and punish judicial corruption. While independence should be
respected and protected, this is not to say that the judiciary should be free
from public accountability.
The Bank also emphasized the need for consensus and support from
all levels of government and civil society for sustainable reform.53 Several
Bank publications recognized the necessity of government commitment for
ensuring that judicial reform projects will succeed. A 1994 Bank report
stated, “Legal reform cannot be successful without the full conviction and
political commitment of the government concerned.”54 One year later, the
Bank expanded on this point: “In order for legal technical assistance to
bring about the desired results, the recipient governments need to
demonstrate a clear commitment to legal reform and take full ownership of
the legal reform process.”55
As Bank documents developed the importance of government
commitment, they also began to recognize the importance of participation
at all levels of project development and implementation. Participation of
key stakeholders in the evolution of a project is closely linked to the Bank’s
ownership policy. Citing the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for
Development, the General Counsel identified the partnership between civil
society and government as an “important prerequisite for sustainable
development.”56 He continued, “The World Bank recognizes the integral
link between participation and the achievement of the Bank’s ultimate
objective—poverty reduction . . . . Thus, the Bank endeavors to the extent
possible to include the local community in the design, implementation, and
evaluation of Bank projects.”57 Increased public participation, according to
the Bank, will allow those most affected by Bank projects to have a voice
in their design and execution, and consequently will improve the quality
and sustainability of those projects.58
We have dealt so far with principles and strategy. As we discussed in
the first section, the Bank by the early 1990s decided that it could
legitimately enter the business of judicial reform. Yet, the scope and
boundaries remained unclear. By the early 2000s, as seen in this section,

53. Dakolias, supra note 34, at 172; SHIHATA, supra note 10, at 149.
54. WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE, THE WORLD BANK’S EXPERIENCE 27 (1994).
55. BUILDING ON QUICKSAND, supra note 27, at 3 (citing WORLD BANK LEGAL DEPARTMENT,
THE WORLD BANK AND LEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE—INITIAL LESSONS (1995) (World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper No. 1414)).
56. SHIHATA, supra note 10, at 59.
57. Id. at 60; see also WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND PARTICIPATION 19 (1994).
58. See SHIHATA, supra note 10, at 61.
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the Bank devised a strategy in order to better orient and shape its
operations. The strategy speaks clearly on the Bank’s legitimate and
priority attention to judicial independence including the concern with
political intrusiveness. It affirms that there is no truly independent judiciary
without the respect of the executive and legislative branches. Political
power must uphold, not undermine, judicial impartiality. As the Bank
further acknowledges, there is a moral dimension to judicial independence.
In fact, judicial independence depends on the integrity and impartiality of
judges as “guardians of public trust.” In this regard, the strategy report
recognizes that this hinges on “changing attitudes.” While the report
emphasizes the integrity and attitudinal changes of judges, as we shall
further discuss, this must be viewed in the context of the broader society
and its cultural values and expectations. We now turn to the actual practice
of the Bank.
II. JUDICIAL REFORM: IN PRACTICE
This Section comprehensively examines the Bank’s portfolio of standalone operations, analyzing how it addresses judicial independence in such
projects. It begins with a brief overview of their objectives, elements and
costs.
A. The World Bank’s Portfolio of Judicial Reform Projects
The Bank’s engagement in the justice sector has grown considerably
in the last two decades, with the approval of thirty-six stand-alone judicial
reform projects.59 Of these, twenty-one are closed and sixteen remain
active.60 These operations spread across all geographical regions. While
some projects focus on one single element (e.g. training or case
management), others take a comprehensive approach and cover multiple
elements. An overview of these projects’ objectives, design and costs will

59. See World Bank, Directions in Justice Reform: Discussion Note, http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/EXTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/wb_jr_discussionnote.pdf, (last visited April 20, 2011);
THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/ WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
PROJECTS/0,,menuPK:115635~pagePK:64020917~piPK:64021009~theSitePK:40941,00.html
(last
visited April 20, 2011).
In addition to the closed and active projects, there is one self-standing project in the pipeline (Kenya,
Judicial Performance Improvement) and five dropped projects (Russian Federation, Judicial Reform
Support Project; Kenya, Justice and Integrity Project; Sri Lanka, Legal and Judicial Infrastructure
Development Project; Cambodia, Legal and Judicial Reform Project; and Mozambique, Legal Capacity
Project). Id.
60. Id.
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provide a necessary background for the subsequent analysis of the manner
in which the Bank evaluates and addresses judicial independence.61
1. Objectives
Projects may have a single objective or multiple ones. Those with a
single objective generally concern judicial efficiency. For example, the first
stand-alone project (Venezuela Judicial Infrastructure Project) had
objectives to: (1) improve efficiency in the allocation of resources within
the judiciary, (2) increase courtroom productivity and efficiency, and (3)
reduce the private sector costs of dispute resolution.62 By increasing
courtroom productivity and efficiency, the project expected to reduce the
private sector and individual costs of dispute resolution.63
The second stand-alone project (Bolivia Judicial Reform) aimed not
only to improve the efficiency of the judiciary but also, primarily, its
quality. As the first phase of a long-term program, it sought to “improve the
quality and effectiveness of civil justice administration,” and to “strengthen
the capacity of the judiciary . . . and of the Ministry of Justice to prepare,
review, and implement laws and programs related to the country’s
constitutional, judicial, economic and social reforms.”64
In an effort to distinguish the Bolivia project from the previous
Venezuela operation—highly criticized for its narrow scope, among other
things—the Bank noted that the former had a more balanced and holistic
perspective. The project “would aim to increase efficiency through
improved courtroom administration” but also “seek improvements in the
quality of the justice provided by the present system.”65 Further, “its
foundation is reform of the judicial incentive framework and of the judicial
process itself, thereby striking the necessary balance between quality and
efficiency issues.”66 While the first Venezuela project emphasized the
infrastructure aspects of justice administration, the Bolivia project
“attempted to strike a balance between the policy, organizational and
infrastructure aspects of justice administration.”67

61. See infra Appendix 1.
62. Staff Appraisal Report: Venezuela 1992, supra note 28, at 16.
63. Id. at 20.
64. World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report, Bolivia Judicial Reform Project, at 15, Report No.
13052 (March 24, 1995) [hereinafter Staff Appraisal Report: Bolivia 1995].
65. Id. at 14.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 29.
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After the Bolivia project, the substantial majority of the Bank’s
projects declared objectives beyond that of improving efficiency.68 These
projects generally sought to increase the overall quality or effectiveness of
the respective judicial systems.69
Some projects aimed at increasing access to justice. Access to justice
appears for the first time as an objective in the 1996 Ecuador Judicial
Reform Project.70 While the main focus of the Ecuador project was on
judicial efficiency, it also dealt with access issues. The objective of the
Ecuador Judicial Reform Project was to improve access to justice, the
efficiency of judicial services, and the participation of civil society in
judicial reform.71 Other projects which aimed to improve access to justice
included those in Peru, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Armenia,
Bangladesh, Philippines, El Salvador, Mongolia, Mexico, and Honduras.72
The Bangladesh project identified a disincentive to foreign investment as a
result of significant shortcomings in access to justice that stemmed from
weak procedure, untrained court staff, and poor physical infrastructure.73
Judicial independence is an explicit objective in very few projects.
The first one was the 1997 Peru Judicial Reform Project. In fact, this
project was cancelled because of insufficient government commitment to
judicial independence.74 Other projects include the 1999 Georgia Judicial
Reform Project; the 2000 Armenia Judicial Reform Project; the 2005 Peru
Justice Services Modernization Project; and the 2006 Sudan Capacity
Building of the National Judiciary.75 The Georgia project sought to address

68. The phrasing of the objectives is not consistent across the projects. In some cases, the
objective of improving effectiveness includes other aspects such as efficiency and integrity (e.g. Bolivia
and Philippines projects). Other projects separate the objectives of efficiency, transparency and
accountability from that of effectiveness. And in other operations, different terms are used such as
responsiveness, professionalism, competence, predictability, and accountability.
69. See THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, supra note 59.
70. World Bank, Clustered Project Performance Assessment Report, Ecuador Judicial Reform
Project (Loan 4066), Guatemala Judicial Reform Project (Loan 4401), Colombia Judicial Conflict
Resolution Project (Loan 7081), Report No. 55277 (June 30, 2010) [hereinafter Clustered PPAR 2010].
71. Id. at 7.
72. See infra Appendix 1.
73. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 23.6
Million (US$ 30 Million Equivalent) to the People’s Republic of Bangladesh for a Legal and Judicial
Capacity Building Project, at 21, Report No. 21863-BD (Mar. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Project Appraisal
Document: Bangladesh 2001].
74. See World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US 12
million to the Republic of Peru for a Justices Services Improvement Project, at 9, Report No. 27861-PE
(February 9, 2004) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Peru 2004]; BUILDING ON QUICKSAND,
supra note 27, at 18.
75. As further discussed in the next section, this explicit reference to judicial independence does
not reflect any significant difference with all other projects. See infra Part II.2.
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widespread corruption, legal uncertainty, poor enforcement of laws and
regulations, and inadequate protection of property rights and contracts
through judicial independence reforms.76 Unfortunately, this explicit
reference to judicial independence is not dispositive: there is no clear
distinction between these few projects which explicitly state judicial
independence as an objective and the other projects in the portfolio which
do not.
2. Project Design
The projects range from those with a narrow scope to others with a
very comprehensive reach. Some projects focus, either exclusively or
primarily, on one element such a court administration or judicial training.
Other projects, such as Albania, support a much broader set of elements
including legal education, legal information, court administration and case
management, judicial training, judicial enforcement, and alternative dispute
resolution.
As a recent Bank report indicates, the most common judicial reform
element is court administration and case management. This element is
included in 89% of projects.77 Many times this element is accompanied by
infrastructure investments which appear in almost half of the projects.78
Legal drafting and transparency of legal information is found in 78% of
projects.79 Legal drafting is very significant in Kazakhstan, Yemen,
Morocco, Sri Lanka, and Croatia.80 In Kazakhstan, the market reforms
undertaken during the 1990s required legal institutional changes that lagged
behind economic reforms. A project addressing legal drafting became
necessary because new laws often underwent continuous revision and yet
remained inconsistent with existing laws.81 Access to legal information is a
primary focus in Venezuela 1997, Kazakhstan, Albania, Morocco,
Armenia, Croatia, and Mongolia. Some projects target legal education in
law schools including Albania and Mongolia.82

76. See World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR
9.9 million (US$ 13. 4 million equivalent) to Georgia for a Judicial Reform Project, at 6, Report No.
19346-GE (June 7, 1999) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999].
77. Directions in Justice Reform: Discussion Note, supra note 59, at 2.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. E.g., World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US
$16.5 million equivalent to the Republic of Kazakhstan for a Legal Reform Project, at 6, Report No.
18792-KZ (April 19, 1999) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Kazakhstan 1999].
81. See id. at 4.
82. E.g., id. at 22.
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More than half of the projects include training legal professionals,
including those in the justice sector. The purposes of the training differ
across projects. In some, the training focuses primarily on management and
administration (Venezuela 1992, Argentina) or substantive business law
(e.g. Kazakhstan).83 Most training components, however, have a more
holistic approach and target knowledge, skills, and attitudes of the
participants. Ethical training is a key ingredient in several operations.84 In
Bolivia, the Bank attributed weak judicial autonomy to political patronage,
a long-standing problem in Bolivia history as the report asserts. Indeed,
“Political patronage and regional interests are the main forces driving
personnel decisions, outweighing consideration of professional excellence,
probity and administrative effectiveness.”85 It stresses that judicial
appointments and career advancement mostly result from political or
personal connections.86 These are perverse incentives which the Bank
project sought to address directly.
Access to justice components may be found in several operations.
These include Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), legal aid and public
outreach programs. Several projects include investments to strengthen
ADR including Ecuador (mediation), Yemen (training of arbitrators),
Guatemala (justices of peace, mobile courts, mediation), Sri Lanka
(mediation), Bangladesh (small case courts, arbitration), Bolivia (justices of
peace, arbitration), Armenia (arbitration), Colombia (conciliation),
Philippines (mobile courts), Peru 2004 (community justice), Mexico (small
claims, public defender and Honduras (mobile courts, arbitration, public
defenders).87 The Bangladesh project included these small claims and
arbitration components in order to address a substantial judicial backlog
that was negatively affecting access to justice.88
Legal aid, public awareness, and education programs are also
significant areas of assistance in Georgia, Yemen, Guatemala, Morocco,
Armenia, Bangladesh, Peru 2004, Honduras, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan,
Armenia, Peru 2010, Philippines, El Salvador, Mongolia, and Mexico.89
Other special focus areas include (a) judicial selection, evaluation,
promotion, and disciplinary procedures (found in Peru 1997, Bolivia, Peru
2004, Honduras, Peru 2010); (b) enforcement of judicial decisions
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See Staff Appraisal Report: Venezuela 1992, supra note 28.
Id.
Staff Appraisal Report: Bolivia 1995, supra note 64, at 6.
Id. at 5.
See THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, supra note 59.
Project Appraisal Document: Bangladesh 2001, supra note 73.
E.g., id. at 41.
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(Georgia, Armenia and Albania; largest component in Albania); (c) ethics
infrastructure including “supply” and “demand” side measures (special
emphasis in Guatemala (whole component), Philippines, El Salvador, Peru
2004, Mexico); and (d) supporting registries (Morocco (largest
component), Sri Lanka, Azerbaijan).90
3. Costs
The total amount of estimated costs for all projects amounts to over
US $1.1 billion and the total amount of Bank lending exceeds three
quarters of a billion dollars.91 The lending amounts for these projects range
from US $2.4 million to US $130 million.92 Court administration, case
management, and physical infrastructure represent the largest project
components in terms of dollar amount investments.93 Further, these
administration, management, and infrastructure components represent
about two-thirds of the investments in a majority of the projects, including:
Venezuela 1992, Ecuador, Peru 1997, Venezuela 1997, Armenia, Georgia,
Bangladesh, Croatia, Philippines, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru 2004,
Azerbaijan, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Mongolia, Afghanistan,
Armenia, Colombia, and Croatia.94 In some of these projects, they account
for virtually the whole investment cost (e.g. Venezuela 1994, Bangladesh,
El Salvador, Macedonia, Romania, and Croatia).95 Infrastructure alone
accounts for at least half of the investments in several projects, including
Venezuela 1992, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Macedonia, Romania,
Afghanistan, and Armenia.96 The Georgia project document indicates that
51 percent of the project financing went to infrastructure rehabilitation.97
This broad overview of the Bank’s portfolio shows a primary
emphasis on “operational” and “structural” aspects of the judiciary. Issues
of court administration and case management are prevalent throughout
virtually all projects. Support for court buildings and other infrastructure
are substantial. Assistance for more critical issues of judicial selection,
performance and discipline is largely of a formal and technical nature,
dealing with new structures, mechanisms and processes. Training of judges
90. See, e.g., World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of
US$9.0 Million to Albania for a Legal and Judicial Reform Project, at 3, Report No. 19915-ALB (Mar.
1, 2000) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Albania 2000].
91. See infra Appendix 1.
92. Id.
93. World Bank, Directions in Justice Reform: Discussion Note, supra note 59, at 2.
94. See infra Appendix 1.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76, at 7.
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mainly targets knowledge and administrative skills. On the demand side,
the emphasis lies in access to legal information, legal aid and mechanisms
for external accountability. Deeper issues concerning the cultural and moral
foundations and incentives of political leaders, and society at large, for
values of judicial independence and impartiality are largely ignored or
marginalized. Next we turn to an inquiry on how the Bank assesses the
degree of “true” judicial independence from political authorities and how it
seeks to strengthen such judicial independence in its operations.
B. The Bank’s Approach to Judicial Independence
The independence of the judiciary is one of the central pillars on
which both a liberal democratic system and an efficient and equitable
market economy rest.98 Among all of the weaknesses of developing country
judiciaries, a lack of judicial independence is among the most serious,
because it infringes on the ability of judiciaries to carry out their primary
responsibilities: dispute resolution, contract enforcement, deterrence of
crime, and constraining government abuse of power. In this regard, because
of its actual and potential serious threats to judicial independence,
protecting judges from political interference is of the highest concern.
As previously noted, the Bank’s strategy affirms the centrality of
judicial independence to the rule of law and judicial reform. Indeed, “The
principle of judicial independence is a central feature of the programs
undertaken by the Bank.”99 Legal and judicial reform cannot succeed
without an independent judiciary. According to the Bank, judicial
independence “has two functions: one is to limit government power and the
other is to protect the rights of individuals.”100 The Bank accordingly
defines an independent judiciary as “one that issues decisions and makes
judgments that are respected and enforced by the legislative and executive
branches; that receives an adequate appropriation from the legislature; and
that is not compromised by political attempts to undermine its
impartiality.”101
The following analysis of the Bank’s approach to judicial
independence in its stand-alone judicial reform projects will draw upon the
appraisal of the projects by the Bank’s operational staff as reflected in the
respective reports (staff appraisal report (SAR) or project appraisal

98. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875, 876 (1975).
99. STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS, supra note 38, at 3.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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documents (PAD)). These are the key project reports in which “[World]
Bank staff assess the intrinsic quality of a project and evaluate the critical
risks to which the project is exposed.”102 In addition to these appraisal
reports, internal evaluation reports, known as Implementation Completion
Reports (ICRs) and Project Performance Assessment Reports (PPARs),
issued by the Bank in regard to closed projects, provide additional valuable
information.103 Three questions will be addressed: (1) To what extent is
judicial independence identified and assessed as a judicial sector issue? (2)
How is judicial independence addressed in the design of the projects? And
(3) how do the Bank’s internal evaluations deal with judicial
independence?
1. To What Extent Is Judicial Independence Identified and Assessed as
a Sector Issue?
According to Bank policy, its investment projects must “be anchored
in country policy/sector analysis; and reflect lessons learned from the
Bank’s experience.”104 The appraisal reports (SARs and PADs) include
brief analyses of the respective sector’s salient features. This analysis is
often based on in-depth analytical work undertaken by the Bank.
In reviewing the appraisal reports on the judicial reform projects, it is
hard to find a consistent and coherent approach on the treatment of judicial
independence. As a starting point, we note that there are a few project
documents which are either silent on judicial independence as a judicial
102. World Bank, Operational Manual, World Bank Procedure 10.00 - Annex D, Jan. 15, 1994,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,co
ntentMDK:20065821~menuPK:64701637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.h
tml. I recognize that an analysis on the basis of the publicly available written record has its limitations.
They are not necessarily a perfect and exhaustive source. The insights of this article must be viewed in
such context and, hopefully, as a small contribution and catalyst for further research and analysis.
103. The ICRs are prepared by a team appointed by the respective regional sector manager or team
leader at the time of project completion. These reports assess (a) the degree to which the respective
project achieved its development objective and outputs as set out in the respective project documents;
(b) other significant outcomes and impacts; (c) prospects for the respective project’s sustainability; and
(d) World Bank and borrower performance, including compliance with relevant World Bank safeguard
and business policies. See World Bank, Operational Manual – Implementation Completion Reporting, §
13.55, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUA
L/0,,contentMDK:20064672~menuPK:64701637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:5021
84,00.html. The PPARs are prepared by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group. See World
Bank, Operational Manual - Monitoring and Evaluation, § 13.60, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:21345677~menuPK:647
01637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.html.
104. World Bank, Operational Manual - Investment Lending: Identification to Board Presentation,
§ 10.00, available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/
EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:20064659~menuPK:64701637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108
~theSitePK:502184,00.html.
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sector issue or simply acknowledge that judicial independence is secured or
part of the government’s strategy for judicial reform.105 In the remaining
projects, while receiving more attention on the face of the documentary
evidence, the scope and details of the analysis differ. A number of projects
identify the problem of judicial independence, either in general or as
specific manifestations of political interference (i.e. political interference in
judicial appointments or enforcement of judicial decisions) and refer to
constitutional and legal reform measures taken by the respective
governments to strengthen judicial independence.106
Other projects identify judicial independence as the main or key issue
facing the respective judiciary.107 At one level, there are project documents

105. E.g., World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR
13,600,000 to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for a Legal and Judicial Reforms Project,
Report No. 20135-CE (May 12, 2000) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Sri Lanka 2000]
(giving limited sector analysis with no mention of judicial independence); World Bank, Project
Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US$18.2 million to the Republic of El
Salvador for a Judicial Modernization Project, Report No. 24201-ES (July 5, 2002) [hereinafter Project
Appraisal Document: El Salvador 2002] (referencing that constitution has secured independence of the
judiciary); World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Learning and Innovation Lending
Credit in the Amount of SDR 4.0 Million (US$5.0 Million Equivalent) to Mongolia for a Legal and
Judicial Reform Project, Report No. 23286-MOG (November 19, 2001) [hereinafter Project Appraisal
Document: Mongolia 2001] (referencing that judicial independence is one of the values of the
government’s judicial reform strategy).
106. See, e.g., Project Appraisal Document: Bangladesh 2001, supra note 73, at 6, 85 (referencing
a relevant Supreme Court judgment and a brief statement in a policy letter declaring that “The
Government believes in the separation and independence of the judiciary. For that matter appropriate
steps are being taken. It has already initiated the process of delegating more financial powers and
autonomy to the Supreme Court.”); World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Learning
and Innovation Loan in the Amount of US$5.0 Million Equivalent to the Republic of Croatia for Court
and Bankruptcy Administration Project, at 15, Report No. 19995-HR (June 13, 2001) [hereinafter
Project Appraisal Document: Croatia 2001] (referencing problems of political interference and
corruption and to unspecified measures taken by the government to address such issues); Staff
Appraisal Report: Venezuela 1992, supra note 28, at 11 (referencing problems of political influence in
judicial selection criteria and government reform efforts, including proposed constitutional reforms, to
de-politicize judicial appointments); World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report on a
Proposed Loan in the Amount of $US 33 Million Equivalent to the Republic of Guatemala for a Judicial
Reform Project, at 2 (Mar. 10, 2008) [hereinafter ICR: Guatemala 2008] (referencing the government’s
strategy to strengthen judicial independence and related reform measures including the new
Constitutional Court, the new Judicial Council, a new judicial career, a budgetary earmark for the
Judiciary, and human rights guarantees); World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report, Ecuador Judicial Reform
Project, at 7, Report No. 15385-EC (June 24, 1996) [hereinafter Staff Appraisal Report: Ecuador 1996]
(referencing government’s overall program to de-politicize the judiciary and strengthen independence
and related reform measures including new mechanisms for selecting judges, a new Constitutional
Tribunal, a new Ombudsman and independent prosecutor’s office).
107. Two of the earlier World Bank projects with judicial independence as a central focus were
Bolivia (1995) and Peru (1997). Staff Appraisal Report: Bolivia 1995, supra note 64, at 6. In Peru, the
World Bank attempted to support bold measures to restore judicial independence particularly in relation
to judicial tenure. However, political interference and the lack of adequate government commitment led
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that apparently reflect a general de jure assessment of judicial
independence and distinguish the constitutional and legal independence
from “independence in practice.” Indeed, the first project to make this
distinction is the Albania project. As the report states, the Albanian
judiciary has long suffered from excessive executive interference. It notes
that “Albania’s new Constitution of November 1998 provides a clear
foundation for judicial independence and the new law on Judicial
Organization gives further legislative basis for this independence.”108 To
achieve independence in practice, however, the Bank contends that judges
“will need the tools to help them operate independently.”109 These tools
include education, safety, reasonable working conditions and salaries, legal
information, effective court and case management procedures, and a noncorrupt environment. The Morocco project follows the same approach as
the Albania project. While the Bank notes that there is de jure judicial
independence in Morocco, it adds that judges need the tools to achieve
“independence in practice.”110
At another level, one finds a few project documents reflecting explicit
criteria for evaluating judicial independence. A good example is the case of
Armenia. In this operation, the Bank is not only more candid about the
specific manifestations of a weak judicial independence but also assesses
the necessary improvements from the perspective of personal and
institutional independence.111 In noting the progress made since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Bank emphasizes constitutional and
legal reforms. The new constitution of 1995 establishes the principle of an

to the cancellation of the project. World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report, Peru Judicial Reform Project,
Report No. 17137-PE (Oct. 27, 1997) [hereinafter Staff Appraisal Report: Peru 1997]; World Bank,
Project Completion Note, Peru Judicial Reform Project, Report No. 20669 (June 30, 2000) [hereinafter
Project Completion Note: Peru 2000]. Other projects include Venezuela (1997); Albania; Morocco;
Armenia, Georgia, Peru (2004); Mexico; Macedonia; Romania; Russia (2007); and Kazakhstan. See
infra Appendix I.
108. Project Appraisal Document: Albania 2000, supra note 90, at 6.
109. Id. at 7.
110. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of EURO 5.6
million (US$ 5.3 Million Equivalent) to the Kingdom of Morocco for a Legal and Judicial Development
Project, at 3, 5, Report No. 20457-MOR (May 18, 2000) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document:
Morocco 2000] (noting that “The Moroccan constitutional system is formally based on the principle of
separation of powers and article 82 of the Constitution provides clearly for the independence of the
judiciary” and “[e]nsuring the rule of law in Morocco requires a properly functioning legal and judicial
system. This calls for enforcement of the country’s laws and regulations by a competent, transparent
and independent judiciary.”).
111. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 8.6
Million (US$ 11.4 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Armenia for a Judicial Reform Project, at 4-7,
Report No. 20820-AM (Aug. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Armenia 2000]
(noting a state of weak judicial independence under Soviet rule).
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independent judiciary and a series of fundamental laws enacted during the
period 1997–1999 provide a legislative framework for the establishment of
a new independent judiciary.112 These “bold measures to develop and
enhance judicial independence in Armenia” target the personal
independence of judges (life tenure, appointment and removal from the
office, compensation, safety, and immunity from prosecution) as well as
institutional autonomy of the judiciary.113
Regarding the personal independence of judges, the PAD explains the
changes these laws made in areas of tenure, removal, disciplinary
procedures and selection. These laws generally “conform to commonly
recognized standards of judicial independence.”114 And yet they are far
from perfect. Refinement in the areas of judicial qualification exams, the
executive role in judicial nomination, disciplinary and removal procedures
would improve Armenia’s de jure independence.115 In addition, it notes that
the key to developing a truly independent judiciary, perceived as corrupt
and partial, lies mainly in the implementation of the new laws.116
With respect to institutional autonomy, the Bank notes the creation of
a separate judiciary body (the Council of Court Chairmen (CCC)) to
assume court administration responsibilities from the Ministry of Justice as
“a significant development towards strengthening independence of the
Armenian judiciary.”117 It also notes that “[not] only judges personally, but
also the courts as institutions need protection from external pressure, and
for courts to operate independently require appropriate funding—both
sufficient and stable.”118 In this respect, the PAD describes specific
measures including a separate budgetary item for the judiciary budget, a
separate budget line item for each court, and the CCC’s exclusive authority

112. Id. at 4.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 5.
115. Id. at 10. As noted in the PAD for the second Armenia judicial reform project, constitutional
reforms were approved in 2005 providing for the creation of a General Congress of Judges as the
highest governing body of the judiciary and new procedures for composition of the Council of Justice
which significantly reduced executive branch representation and power over judicial appointments and
advancements. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR
15.2 Million (US$ 22.5 Million Equivalent) for a Second Judicial Reform Project in the Republic of
Armenia, at 2, Report No. 38361-AM (Feb. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Armenia
2007].
116. Project Appraisal Document: Armenia 2000, supra note 111, at 9-10.
117. Id. at 6.
118. Id.
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to prepare a budgetary proposal for the judiciary and administer the use of
budgetary resources.119
The Romania project is also explicit about the evaluation criteria. As
the report states, “The degree of independence of the judiciary from the
political authorities is traditionally assessed by: (i) the ways in which
judges are appointed, transferred, promoted or dismissed; (ii) the level of
judicial self-governance; and (iii) the level of budgetary autonomy.”120 In
evaluating the constitutional and legal framework, the report notes that
some provisions are aligned with European standards while others,
specifically in the area of budgetary autonomy, fall short.121
While the level of analysis may differ, these project documents
recognize that “de jure” reforms are not sufficient to guarantee judicial
independence. Indeed, several PADs observe the “gap” between the law or
the norm and the practice. Some cite public opinion surveys showing that,
despite better laws in the books, the judiciary is perceived as not
independent from political authorities and pressures.122 This is a
119. Id. Like Armenia, the Georgia PAD similarly observes a traditionally subordinate judiciary
and describes the legal steps required to enhance judicial independence. These steps include the
unification of jurisdiction (eliminating military jurisdiction); a new Judicial Council with
responsibilities on administration (transferred from Ministry of Justice), new framework for
qualification examinations for judges and salary increases. The report adds that the first rounds of
examinations of judges were generally recognized in the country and overseas as transparent and fair.
Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76, at 3-4.
120. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of EURO 110.0
Million (US$130.0 Million Equivalent) to Romania for a Judicial Reform Project, at 33, Report No.
33987-RO (Nov. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Romania 2005].
121. Id. See also World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of
EURO 10.0 Million (US$ 12.4 Million Equivalent) to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for a
Legal and Judicial Implementation and Institutional Support Project, at 10, Report No. 35506-MK
(May 10, 2006) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Macedonia 2006] (noting that judicial
independence in Macedonia is threatened by both political manipulation of judicial appointments and
financial control); World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of
US$30 Million to the Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos, S.N.C. (Banobras) with the
Guarantee of the United Mexican States for a State Judicial Modernization Supporting Access to
Justice Project, at 66, 72-74, Report No. 27946-MX (June 4, 2004) [hereinafter Project Appraisal
Document: Mexico 2004] (noting external and internal challenges to judicial independence); World
Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US$ 50 Million to the Russian
Federation for a Judicial Reform Support Project, at 17-19, Report No. 36104-RU (Jan. 19, 2007)
[hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Russia 2007] (noting internal and external challenges to the
judiciary).
122. Project Appraisal Document: Peru 2004, supra note 74, at 7-11 (2004) (noting that “[n]early
90% of the enterprises and households surveyed believed that the Judiciary is not independent from
political groups, nor that justice has been administered in a fair and equitable manner.”); World Bank,
Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 10.0 Million (US$ 15 Million
Equivalent) to the Republic of Honduras for a Judicial Branch Modernization Project, at 7, Report No.
32128-HN (June 6, 2005) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Honduras 2005] (noting that
“. . .[t]he overwhelming majority of respondents to a more recent survey stated that the Judiciary is
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fundamental point. Indeed, the “gap” factor is highly relevant in
determining government commitment to meaningful and sustainable reform
and political risks for the projects. It reflects the degree of actual respect by
public authorities for the independence of judges and the courts, an
essential mark of a truly independent judiciary. Regardless of what the law
in the books says, and declaratory statements made by government
authorities, a record of political interference in the judiciary places such
commitment in doubt. As previously discussed, the significance of
ownership and commitment is affirmed repeatedly as one of the lessons
learned from Bank operations. For example, the Yemen PAD states that
“The lessons learned from these projects have underscored the importance
of ownership and commitment at the highest level of government and of
counterpart commitment. Experience indicates that local stakeholders need
to be involved at the outset, both in studying the legal system and
developing proposals for change.”123 In a similar fashion, the Morocco
appraisal report affirms that:
The lessons learned underscore the crucial importance of ownership and
commitment at the highest level of government, as well as of the need
for stability of relevant government policies and of leadership . . . strong
and sustained support for legal and judicial reform by the country’s
highest political authorities is crucial.124

The Bank has emphasized that the most compelling evidence of
borrower commitment to judicial reform is its actual “track record.”125 It is

influenced by economic and political pressures.”); World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a
Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 14.8 Million (US$21.6 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of
Azerbaijan for a Judicial Modernization Project, at 91, Report No. 35447-AZ (June 5, 2006)
[hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Azerbaijan 2006] (noting that “[p]ublic opinion tends to
regard most judges as subject to political or economic influence, otherwise known as “telephone
justice.”); Project Appraisal Document: Macedonia 2006, supra note 121, at 34 (noting that “[t]he
independence of the judiciary is a principle laid down in the Constitution and the Law on Courts.
However, there are some obstacles to the full independence of judges from political influence in
practice.”); Project Appraisal Document: Romania 2005, supra note 120, at 33 (noting that the “legacy
of subordination of the judiciary to state interests and to the party apparatus, and exploitation of the
judiciary by the state as an official device to validate such prerogatives, is very strong and continues to
cloud how judges and the court system are perceived.”); Project Appraisal Document: Russia 2007,
supra note 121, at 2 (noting that “[j]udicial independence, integrity and competence are widely
perceived as unsatisfactory, by both the authorities and the public.”).
123. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Learning and Innovation Credit in
the Amount of SDR 1.8 million equivalent to the Republic of Yemen for a Legal and Judicial
Development Project, at 9 (June 28, 1999) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Yemen 1999].
124. Project Appraisal Document: Morocco 2000, supra note 110, at 19.
125. Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76, at 10.
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not clear, however, whether Bank practice recognizes this reality. In those
operations with a stronger focus on judicial independence, the evidence
consists mostly of structural measures (i.e. constitutional and legal norms,
organizational structures).126 In other projects, the proof of government
commitment and ownership is largely of a formal and technical nature.127
Project documents mainly refer to declaratory statements of support for the
projects by the judiciary and other government leaders; initiation of project
activities of a technical nature; formation of technical teams, inter-agency
groups and coordinating commissions; and even the request for funding
from the Bank.128
Concerns about political infringements on judicial independence
surface in some operations as either explicit or implicit project risks or
assumptions. In any event, it is hard to find coherence and consistency in
whether, and how, these risks are identified and qualified. The Kazakhstan
PAD explains that one of the risks is that “judicial independence is
impeded upon and judicial role in administration and education is
minimized.”129 Further, the Bank recognizes that the project is
“implemented in a highly political environment, affecting the role of the
state, both internally—the relation between the executive, the legislature
and the judiciary—as externally, in its relation with society at large.”130 The

126. See World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Credit in the Amount
of US $ 13.33 million (SDR 9.87 Million Credit) to Georgia for a Judicial Reform Project, at 14 (May
17, 2007) [hereinafter Georgia Judicial Reform 2007]; Staff Appraisal Report: Peru 1997, supra note
107; Project Appraisal Document: Armenia 2000, supra note 111; Project Completion Note, Peru
Judicial Reform Project, supra note 107; World Bank, Sudan Multi Donor Trust Fund, Final Project
Proposal, The Rule of Law Sector Capacity Building of the Sudan Judiciary, at 6-8 (Feb. 28 2006)
[hereinafter 2006 Sudan Capacity].
127. Project Appraisal Document: El Salvador 2002, supra note 105, at 19.
128. E.g., id. at 19 (referencing to government requests for donor financing, the approval of the
project by Supreme Court, new technical team and assignment of technical staff to the project and
declaration of support of project by executive branch); Project Appraisal Document: Yemen 1999,
supra note 123 (referencing to declaration by council of ministers, a workshop with judiciary
representatives, compilation of legislation, establishment of a legal reform center and request for World
Bank financial assistance of the project); Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76
(referencing to participation of stakeholders, support by executive and legislative branches, assumption
by Council of Justice of control of the reform process, preparation of master plan for court
administration and case management and declaration by President that judicial reform is essential to the
country’s development).
129. Project Appraisal Document: Kazakhstan 1999, supra note 80, at 13.
130. Id. See also Project Appraisal Document: Yemen 1999, supra note 123, at 12 (identifying the
high project risk that “government commitment to supporting an objective and independent judiciary
may falter due to budgetary constraints; changes in high-level ministerial staffing or pressure from
entrenched interests”); Project Appraisal Document: Albania 2000, supra note 90, at 23 (project risk is
“[i]nformal norms of behavior within the legal and judicial system do not allow new judicial structures
and laws to be applied as laid out in the Albania Constitution and new organic laws”); Project
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Azerbaijan PAD states that there is a risk to “judicial independence and
ethics.”131 In the Russia PAD, the Bank admits that “Political risks are
unavoidable. These arise from the complex interplay and sometimes
conflicting agendas of major actors: different elements of the judiciary, the
executive and the legislature. Such conflicts may be manifested in interagency turf battles, coordination gridlocks, backtracking on reforms, and
delays in project design and implementation.”132 Some PADs include
project assumptions that courts function independently or the presence of a
supportive political environment.133 In other cases, political interference is
arguably implicit in some of the stated risks. Such PADs refer to resistance
from interest groups, government transitions or political pressures.134
2. How Is Judicial Independence Addressed in the Design of the
Projects?
The fact that a project has judicial independence as an explicit
objective does not provide much guidance. As we saw before, judicial
independence is an explicit objective in only a few projects. This does not
appear to signify any distinctive element common to all of these projects.
In fact, there is no special project component or activity and one finds
similar judicial reform elements in other projects. Regarding policy
conditions, it is hard to say if there is any particular difference based on the
publicly available information. In the case of the Peru (1997) project,
progress on restoring judicial tenure was a key policy condition in the
project.135 And it was for reasons of breach with this policy condition that
the project was cancelled.136

Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76, at 15 (critical assumption is a supportive political
environment); Project Appraisal Document: Armenia 2000, supra note 111, at 29 (risk is that “[t]he
judiciary does not overcome administrative (MOJ) and financial (Ministry of Finance and Economy)
control of the executive branch.”).
131. Project Appraisal Document: Azerbaijan 2006, supra note 122, at 26.
132. Project Appraisal Document: Russia 2007, supra note 121, at 9.
133. See Project Appraisal Document: Kazakhstan 1999, supra note 80, at 12; see also Project
Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76, at 15.
134. See, e.g., World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of
US$21.9 Million to the Republic of the Philippines for a Judicial Reform Support Project, at 21, Report
No. 25504 (Jul. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Philippines 2003] (“change in
Supreme Court and hence reform leadership” and “resistance from interest groups that could oppose
reforms”); Project Appraisal Document: Peru 2004, supra note 74, at 29 (explaining that resistance
from special interests and changes in senior officials may prevent or reverse advances in creating a
client-oriented Judiciary and political pressures may limit the ability of sector agencies to move forward
with the reform agenda).
135. BUILDING ON QUICKSAND, supra note 27.
136. See Project Appraisal Document: Peru 2004, supra note 74, at 9; BUILDING ON QUICKSAND,
supra note 27.
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A more relevant distinction, for purposes of the question under
consideration, is the distinction the Bank draws between “structural
independence” and “operational independence” or “independence in
practice.” The first one refers to the constitutional empowerment of the
judiciary to self-governance and is predicated on formal rules and
structures. Many of the projects support such empowerment or formal
autonomy. This is evidenced in the establishment and institutional
strengthening of independent bodies (i.e. judicial councils) for judicial
selection and administration. The second concerns the capacity of the
judiciary to manage and administer its own resources. As we noted in the
previous section, to achieve independence in practice, judges need the
necessary tools such as education, safety, reasonable working conditions
and salaries, legal information and effective court and case management
procedures. Both types of independence are addressed in the projects
though “operational independence” appears to take precedence.
Based on the above distinctions, one may argue that most, if not all, of
the project designs address judicial independence to some extent. Some
projects explicitly claim that their respective interventions indirectly help to
strengthen judicial independence. In the Ecuador SAR, the Bank notes:
The project would aim at strengthening the judiciary in the processing of
cases in an efficient and fair manner—that is, providing judges and court
personnel with new case management techniques, information
technology and mediation procedures which will allow cases to be
resolved in an efficient and effective manner as well as improving access
to justice and the quality of judicial training. Through these components,
the judiciary should experience efficiency gains and improvements in the
quality of service delivered to the public—both of which are elements
contributing to the independence of the judiciary.137

Other projects, as we saw, claim that they build judicial independence
in the sense of “independence in practice” or operational independence.
However, these institutional interventions do not directly address the
underlying cultural and moral forces and incentives underlying the gap

137. Staff Appraisal Report: Ecuador 1996, supra note 106, at 21; see also Project Appraisal
Document: Kazakhstan 1999, supra note 80, at 13-14. (“Extensive judicial training and implementation
of new court and case management techniques are helping to increase the quality, transparency, and
accountability of the courts, and may lead to a more independent judiciary, with significant political
consequences”); Project Appraisal Document: Albania 2000, supra note 108, at 18 (“Fundamental
democratic principles, such as the independence of the judiciary . . . are still new concepts in
Albania . . . . The Project will, however, involve staff of benefiting institutions in training programs
which, it is anticipated, will at least indirectly, have a positive impact.”).
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between formal rules and institutions, one on side, and the actual practices
and behaviors inconsistent with values of independence and impartiality.
3. How Do the Bank’s Internal Evaluations Deal with Judicial
Independence?
The Bank has issued Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs) for
twenty projects and Project Performance Assessment Reports (PPARs) for
six projects.138 The issue of judicial independence figures quite prominently
in the above reports. From a review of these reports, the following
observations emerge.
First, judicial independence is strategically relevant to all judicial
reform projects and must be taken into account at the time of project
conception and appraisal. Failure to do so is a “strategic mistake,” as was
concluded in the Bangladesh project.139 It appears that implementation of
the Bangladesh project was seriously undermined by the judiciary’s
vulnerabilities to political intrusion.140 The Bank project team disregarded
such vulnerabilities and this proved fatal.141 Indeed, the reforms pursued by
the project, primarily new case management models, were not
sustainable.142 The project showed “clear evidence how insufficient
autonomy, if not addressed—e.g. through the design or policy dialogue—
could endanger the reforms.”143 Several other ICRs recognize the relevance
of judicial independence to project success.144

138. THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, supra note 59.
139. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Credit in the Amount of
SDR 23.6 Million (US$ 30.6 Million Equivalent) To the People’s Republic of Bangladesh for a Legal
and Judicial Capacity Building Project, at 15, Report No. ICR00001200 (May 14, 2010) [hereinafter
Implementation Completion: Bangladesh 2010].
140. Id. at 24.
141. Id. at 15.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 23.
144. See World Bank, Implementation Completion Report on a Loan in the Amount of US $5
Million to the Republic of Argentina for a Model Court Development Project, Report No. 35356, at 1617 (Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Implementation Completion Report: Argentina 2006] (noting the failure
to give proper consideration of the sector’s institutional context and assurances of adequate
independence for the judiciary), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/07/24/000112742_20060724121459/Rendered/PDF/353560corrig
endum.pdf; Project Appraisal Document: Kazakhstan 1999, supra note 80, at 3 (noting the direct
relationship between measures to strengthen judicial independence and project success); World Bank,
Implementation Completion Report on a Credit in the Amount of US$2.49 Million to the West Bank and
Gaza for a Legal Development Project, Report No. 29066, at 12 (June 9, 2004) [hereinafter
Implementation Completion Report: West Bank & Gaza 2004] (noting that “[t]o have the maximum
impact, technical reform initiatives should ideally be planned to complement political progress on
creation of the legal and political foundation for reform initiatives”).
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Second, when taking into account judicial independence, it is not
enough to examine the law in the books but one must appraise the law in
practice. The Bangladesh ICR is clear on this point. On speaking about the
failure to adequately assess judicial independence, the report points out
that: “It should have been apparent at the conception of the project that
constitutional restrains on undue influence of the executive power over
judiciary were not working in practice. Arbitrary judicial appointments and
reassignments are just one example of the vulnerabilities of the
Bangladeshi judiciary.”145 Additional infringements on judicial
independence included low salaries and executive control of judicial
removals. Other ICRs also stress the importance of evaluating the de facto
government commitment to reform.146
Lastly, strengthening judicial independence requires a focus on
political attitudes and behavior. Judicial independence was one objective of
the Georgia project.147 However, the ICR found that this project was
properly designed to address technical aspects of judicial effectiveness and
efficiency only; it did not deal with the political complexities of
strengthening judicial independence.148 None of the project outputs directly
advanced judicial independence but rather “provided only indirect support
for the strengthening of the judiciary vis-à-vis the other branches of
government by strengthening the capacity of the judiciary for selfgovernance and providing the tools for improved operational
performance.”149 While Georgia had enacted constitutional safeguards to
protect judicial independence, the ICR Bank noted that such amendments
were insufficient in a climate of weak political will.150 The PPAR
confirmed this concluding that the project components were “unlikely to
lead to judicial independence.”151

145. Implementation Completion: Bangladesh 2010, supra note 139, at 21.
146. See Implementation Completion Report: West Bank & Gaza 2004, supra note 144, at 8
(“[T]here was a serious lack of [Palestinian Authority] commitment to judicial reform.”); World Bank,
Implementation Completion Report on a Credit in the Amount of SDR 6.6 Million to Albania for a
Legal and Judicial Reform Project, at 19, Report No. 35351 (June 12, 2006) (“[t]his project has shown
that there are a variety of basic institution building interventions that can support legal and judicial
development. However, close attention needs to be paid to how these interventions impact and depend
on the balance of power between the executive and the judiciary.”).
147. Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76, at 2-3 (explaining that the project
would “assist in the development of an independent and professional judiciary, committed to high
standards of judicial ethics and capable of efficient, effective dispute resolution.”).
148. Georgia Judicial Reform 2007, supra note 126, at 12.
149. See id. at 13.
150. See id. at 12.
151. Project Performance Assessment Report, Georgia Judicial Reform Project, Structural
Adjustment Credit, Reform Support Credit, Report No. 46832, at 6 (Dec. 29, 2008). In an interesting
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III. JUDICIAL REFORM: REFLECTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Our previous analysis shows that the Bank’s strategy on judicial
reform prioritizes the independence of judges, with particular and special
concern for independence from the political branches. The Bank’s actual
practice, however, demonstrates that the issue of political interference in
the judicial process, though extremely relevant, is not properly assessed
and its underlying cultural and moral dimension is marginalized. Indeed,
there is quite a degree of incoherence and inconsistency in how the Bank
evaluates the degree of judicial autonomy. The evidence at times is
confined to the existence of rules, regardless of their enforcement and
societal support. Further, the Bank not only falls short in evaluating
relevant evidence of political intrusion, but also underestimates the
dimension of personal and cultural values in such corrupt behavior. Indeed,
the project portfolio largely targets structural and operational deficiencies
to address judicial independence.
Let us now turn to these two issues in more detail: the relevant
evidence of judicial independence and the culture dimension of judicial
independence. As I consider these issues, I am fully aware of the
challenges in dealing with such a complex, multifaceted and sensitive
subject. Judicial independence is “a slippery concept, difficult to define let
alone to measure.”152 Indeed, there are no single criteria to evaluate its
presence or absence. It exists in degrees throughout the world and there are
differing views on its foundation. At the same time, let me remind the
reader that the focus of this article is on the independence of judges and the
courts from interference by political authorities. It is one dimension of
judicial independence, albeit a critical one. Indeed, “Government poses
perhaps the most serious threat to judicial independence for two reasons: it
has a potential interest in the outcome of myriad cases, and it has so much
potential power over judges.”153
footnote, the report expanded on the necessary changes to achieve judicial independence, “[t]o have
independent judges a society must create the political and economic incentives to achieve that result,
but the project did not deal with these critical factors. For judicial independence the fundamental
positive question would be: ‘Under what circumstances will politicians maintain judges who are
independent from themselves?’” Id. at 5 n.2 (citing J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN,
MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 4 (2003)).
152. Julio Rios Figueroa, Judicial Independence: Definition, Measurement, and Its Effects on
Corruption. An Analysis of Latin America 2 (2006), available at http://homepages.nyu.edu/~jrf246/
Papers/PhD%20Diss%20JRF.pdf.
153. Matthew Stephenson, Brief, Judicial Independence: What It Is, How It Can Be Measured,
Why It Occurs, WORLD BANK, at 1, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/
Resources/JudicialIndependence.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2011).
While political interference is the focus of this article, I fully recognize that interference may come
from other outside sources. Further, I also recognize that judicial independence in a broad sense is also
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A. The Relevant Evidence of Judicial Independence
To our first question: how does the Bank assess the degree of judicial
autonomy? What is the relevant evidence it looks for? As previously
discussed, the Bank has had opportunities to evaluate the approach taken in
certain projects towards political intrusion in the judiciary. In particular, it
was a key concern in the evaluation of the Bangladesh project. Noting the
strategic relevance of judicial independence, the ICR highlighted the
drastic consequences of disregarding evidence on political interference
with judicial autonomy. In fact, such project showed “clear evidence how
insufficient autonomy, if not addressed—e.g. through the design or policy
dialogue—could endanger the reforms.”154
The previous section has shown that the Bangladesh project is not the
only operation where the Bank has failed to take into account political
interference. In most projects, however, there is documentary evidence
showing that the Bank took into account judicial independence. Yet the
approach that emerges is not consistent, coherent or comprehensive. The
ICR noted that there was “clear evidence on insufficient autonomy.”155
However, it did not suggest or refer to any guidelines on how to go about
this matter.
As its standard practice, the Bank should gather and evaluate
comprehensive evidence, dealing with both de jure and de facto judicial
independence. The Bank must be able to grasp how serious this type of
corruption is and its potential adverse impact on any intervention.
Otherwise, it potentially compromises the Bank’s fiduciary obligations and
its concern for aid effectiveness. A de jure analysis would be a logical
starting point. This requires a careful and thorough review of all relevant
rules, processes and institutions designed to protect judicial independence.
This does not appear to be standard practice in all projects. A failure to
fully assess the de jure judicial independence and the implications for the
project was noted in the Guatemala ICR as it related to the reduced tenure
of Supreme Court and appellate judges.156

a function of the judge’s behavior. Judicial independence is important as a means towards judicial
impartiality, which is essential to good justice. See USAID, Guidance for Promoting Judicial
Independence and Impartiality, at 6 (2002) available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_
and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm007.pdf.
154. Implementation Completion: Bangladesh 2010, supra note 139, at 24.
155. Id.
156. See Clustered PPAR 2010, supra note 70, at 13; World Bank, Clustered Project Performance
Assessment Report for the Guatemala Judicial Reform Project, Report No. ICR0000623 (Mar. 10,
2008).
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The de jure review, however, is clearly inadequate on its own. While
structural safeguards are important, they do not in and of themselves ensure
judicial independence. As the Bank noted in the Georgia ICR: “Tackling
independence head on requires more than the constitutional reforms, it
requires the focus and will of the political leadership.”157 Formal guarantees
of judicial independence are ignored or manipulated in many, if not most,
countries. Thus it is critical to evaluate the de facto conditions.158 To what
extent are the formal rules working in practice? What is the relevant
behavior of political authorities?
There appears to be no consistent and coherent gathering of the de
facto evidence, let alone analysis of its underlying causes. This would
include factual evidence on, among other things, the actual fairness in the
judicial appointment process (including timing of filling judicial
vacancies), the extent to which judges render decisions against the
government, the extent to which the executive and legislative authorities
comply with and enforce judicial decisions, how often are judges changed,
the development of actual salaries and budgets, and the extent to which
jurisdiction of the courts is usurped by the executive and legislative
authorities. Such evidence should be consistently gathered, appraised and
explicitly taken into account when assessing government commitment and
project risks.159
I recognize that there are certainly technical challenges with the de
facto assessments. This requires certain tools and methodologies. Several
efforts and attempts have been made in this regard which may guide the
Bank in developing its standard practice.160 The most significant challenge,

157. Georgia Judicial Reform 2007, supra note 126, at 14.
158. Some scholars argue that it is misleading to distinguish between de facto and de jure “judicial
independence” at the conceptual level. In their view, “[j]udicial independence is best thought of as
either autonomy or power, whereas institutions like fixed tenure, budgetary autonomy, and judicial
councils are best thought of as rules designed to promote autonomy or power. They do not, strictly
speaking, reflect judicial independence.” Julio Rios-Figueroa & Jeffrey Staton, Unpacking the Rule of
Law: A Review of Judicial Independence Measures, 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies,
Nov. 20-21, 2009, at 14 (Apr. 26, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434234.
159. It is interesting to note that this is a type of “de facto” evidence is used by the World Bank to
support the notion that judicial independence is very developed. See World Bank, Project Appraisal
Document on a Proposed Adaptable Program Loan in the Amount of US$20 Million to the Republic of
Colombia for a Justice Services Strengthening Project – Phase I (APLI) in Support of the First Phase of
the Justice Services Strengthening Program, at 31, Report No. 47338-CO (Nov. 6, 2009) [hereinafter
Project Appraisal Document: Colombia 2009] (noting complaints that Constitutional Court has been
too ready to overrule government programs).
160. See Methodology FREEDOM HOUSE, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&
ana_page=341&year=2008 (last visited Nov. 9, 2011); Rios-Figueroa & Staton, supra note 158, at 14;
Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence
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however, may be of a different nature. The de facto evidence will make it
more difficult to contend that there is sufficient political commitment to
meaningful judicial reform. This should impact the ability and willingness
of the Bank to make loans for judicial reform, particularly large operations.
If the record, which the Bank would need to produce and disclose, shows
serious manipulation of the judicial process by political authorities, it
would be much harder to support large investments in court administration
and infrastructure. I am not arguing that the Bank never takes into account
political interference in its judicial reform operations. What I am arguing is
that there needs to be a clear set of policies and procedures of doing so.
B. The Cultural Dimension of Judicial Independence
The second question addressing the problem of “insufficient
autonomy” is: How do we reduce the intrusion by political authorities?
This begs an additional inquiry: What will motivate political leaders to
respect the independence and impartiality of the judicial process?
The behavior in question is of a corrupt nature. Politicians abuse their
authority and influence to advance narrow and selfish interests at the
expense of the public good. Indeed, political interference in the judicial
process is a form of judicial corruption. Transparency International (TI)
defines judicial corruption as “any inappropriate influence on the
impartiality of the judicial process by any actor within the court system.”161
Further, together with bribery, TI deems political interference in the
judicial process as the worst kind of judicial corruption.162 Again, political
interference is expressed through threats, intimidation and bribery of judges
in addition to the manipulation of judicial appointments, salaries and
conditions of service.
The Bank seeks to address the problem of corruption mainly through
reforms in the institutional and incentive framework.163 As the judicial
reform portfolio shows, these reforms include a menu of supply and
demand side measures. They mainly target organizational arrangements
and capabilities in justice institutions as well as building transparency and
external accountability. As discussed in the previous section, judicial
independence is mainly addressed through structural and operational

Using a New Set of Indicators, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 497, 502-08 (2003) (listing twenty de iure and de
facto indicators).
161. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT xxi (2007).
162. See id.
163. See generally World Bank, Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance
and Anticorruption (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTOR
ANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/GACIP.pdf.
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interventions. Yet despite these efforts, there generally is limited impact on
judicial independence and impartiality. There is little or no change in the
public’s perception of judges partial to political pressures. The Bank’s
institutional interventions are not producing the desired outcomes.
Judicial institutions in a society cannot be viewed in isolation from its
broader cultural context and values. There is little doubt that institutional
reforms, as those supported by the Bank, are essential to achieve an
independent and impartial judiciary. Indeed, changes in the rules and
structures that govern the appointment, promotion, performance and
removal of judges are necessary in most settings to ensure greater judicial
autonomy and insulation from political as well as other undue pressures
and influences. Building institutional capabilities, whether in the
management of human resources, budgets or otherwise, is also instrumental
for the effective implementation of such new structures and rules as well as
the improvement of overall judicial performance. Yet, at a deeper level, the
problem of weak judicial independence in a society may stem from deeper
cultural roots.164 Breaches of judicial independence and impartiality are not
merely an outgrowth of inadequate laws, poor institutional design, weak
institutional capabilities, or even insufficient monitoring and
accountability. The institutional environment in a society reflects its
cultural values and attitudes. As one author puts it, “culture is the mother,
institutions are the children.”165 New rules and structures and improved
institutional capabilities and accountability, while absolutely necessary for
building a more independent and impartial judiciary, are certainly not
sufficient if society lacks a foundation of strong cultural values of respect
for the rule of law.
In many social settings, regardless of what formal rules prescribe, the
cultural values and practices clash with principles of judicial independence
and impartiality. Using political power and influence to promote favoritism
for personal or political connections is often perceived as acceptable and
legitimate. This dysfunctional behavior, however, is not always limited to
the political elite. While leaders bear much of the responsibility, the
problem often cuts across all segments and sectors in society. While we

164. See, e.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM 89 (1999); Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Causes and Consequences of
Corruption: What Do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries?, in AN INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 17-18, (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Edward Elgar eds.,
2006).
165. See Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?, in
CULTURE MATTERS, HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS 75 (Lawrence Harrison & Samuel
Huntington eds., 2000).
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need to guard against the temptation to stereotype and oversimplify the
behaviors of communities and individuals, there may be a high degree of
complicity among the citizenry. In fact, “doing favors for family and
friends is such an ingrained behavior in many cultures that magistrates do
not often believe it affects their role as impartial arbiters.”166 In many
societies, these practices are woven into the fabric of everyday life of
ordinary citizens. Relatives and friends expect favoritism and partiality
from those with authority and influence, whether a political leader, police
officer, or teacher. In the words of a Nigerian political leader, “Who gets
to . . . a position of power and then refuses to help his people?”167
These dysfunctional behaviors appear to permeate societies with weak
values of common good and public interest. Distinctions between one’s
private and public roles are not that clear. Despite the existence of adequate
structures, rules and institutional capacity, such societies face formidable
challenges in establishing a modern judiciary with competent judges who
are expected to act impartially. It is not surprising thus that the public
perceives in such societies that that there is no rule of law. Carlos Montaner
put it well as he described a culture of lawlessness prevailing in Latin
America. As he explains, “a large percentage of Latin Americans either
nurture or tolerate relationships in which personal loyalty is rewarded and
merit is substantially ignored. In Latin American culture, loyalty rarely
extends beyond the circle of friends and family. Thus the public sector is
profoundly mistrusted and the notion of the common good is very
weak . . . .”168 The author further affirms that true power in Latin America
resides in the ability to operate above the law.169 What Montaner says about
Latin America is also a reality in other countries and regions around the
world.
The Bank needs to give greater emphasis to the role of culture in its
work on judicial reform. While its framework for judicial reform does
recognize the relevance of cultural factors, the Bank has no system for
actually identifying and addressing the relevant cultural issues. Impartial
justice will not come about primarily through more structural and
operational independence measures. Moral and ethical values are

166. See Mary Noel Pepys, Justice System, in FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
STRATEGIES AND ANALYSIS 18 (Bertram I. Spector ed., 2005) .
167. See Daniel Jordan Smith, The Paradoxes of Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria,
in CORRUPTION, GLOBAL SECURITY, AND WORLD ORDER 290 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009).
168. Id.
169. See Carlos Alberto Montaner, Culture and the Behavior of Elites in Latin America, in
CULTURE MATTERS, HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS 57-58 (Lawrence Harrison & Samuel
Huntington eds., 2000).
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fundamental incentives for independent and impartial justice. Thus “any
approach to corruption that fails to reckon with its moral aspect will be
both descriptively and programmatically inadequate.”170 Reforms must
focus more on cultural and ethical values and attitudes. Intrinsic
motivations deserve greater attention. We should strive for societies where
political leaders, and citizens alike, respect independence and impartiality,
in other words respect the law, because it is the right thing to do, not just
because of possible exposure and being afraid of being caught.
If large segments of society do not value and care enough, political
intrusion, or any other undue influence, in the judicial process will not
diminish. In a welcomed development, the Bank, as other development
agencies, has oriented its reform efforts to include greater civil society
participation and accountability. Indeed, strengthening civil society has
become a common mantra in programs and projects seeking to make
governments more accountable. These reform efforts focus on the impact
that entities outside government can have, working in support of citizen’s
demand for better public institutions. Specific measures involve stronger
NGOs as watchdogs, media capacity and empowering citizens. This
growing focus on demand is reflected in the Bank’s judicial reform
operations. Measures are taken to develop a robust civil society by
increasing access to information and enabling the public to monitor and
challenge the government when necessary. Projects support greater
participation of citizens mainly through awareness campaigns, public
information and education on legal rights and the judiciary and
accountability mechanisms.
There is no doubt that a more informed and empowered citizenry with
greater oversight is key to better government and justice institutions. We
know that corruption flourishes when the public is poorly informed,
apathetic, tolerant or so politically weak as to be unable to protest.
However, is the problem primarily one of a poorly informed, apathetic or
resigned public? Or is it that values of independence and impartiality are
widely lacking in society? The focus on transparency and accountability
places more emphasis on institutional reforms and external incentives while
marginalizing the dimension of personal and social values as fundamental
incentives for decision-making. Civil society oversight will be ineffective if
large segments of the public are not outraged by these corrupt behaviors
but rather see them as legitimate and acceptable. Indeed, citizens will not
care to engage and demand accountability from political leaders and judges

170. Laura S. Underkuffler, Defining Corruption: Implications for Action, in CORRUPTION,
GLOBAL SECURITY, AND WORLD ORDER 37 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009).
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if they are active participants in such undesirable practices. What is worse,
generations of children and youth, the future leaders in these societies,
come to believe that fairness and personal merit do not count and that it is
fine to show partiality and favoritism. This is one of the most fundamental
parts of the problem.
CONCLUSION
The Bank’s approach to judicial independence, largely shared by other
development agencies, is not producing the desired outcomes. In fact,
Transparency International sadly admits that “despite several decades of
reform efforts and international instruments protecting judicial
independence, judges and court personnel around the world continue to
face pressure to rule in favor of powerful political or economic entities,
rather than according to the law.”171 These findings urgently demand a
reexamination of the presuppositions and strategies privileged so far. There
is a need to move beyond discussions about structural independence and
operational independence. It may be more operationally expedient for the
Bank to shy away from deeper inquiry about the degree and underlying
cultural determinants of political intrusiveness in the judicial process and to
prefer a focus on institutional capacity weaknesses. Yet, there is little or no
lasting impact and aid effectiveness is in doubt.
Future projects must include rigorous evidence gathering on the actual
status of a country’s judiciary and political players as shown in practice,
not simply relying on de jure and declarative factors. Ownership of judicial
reform projects, and commitment to them, must be demonstrated by a track
record of positive action over words and in accordance with a clear set of
criteria and guidelines as Bank policy.
As the Bank moves forward in its judicial reform activities, this article
suggests that it review certain blind spots in how it evaluates and addresses
the respect for judicial independence by political authorities. The Bank
needs a stronger and deeper focus on the cultural determinants of the
weaknesses in the rule of law and judicial independence suffered by
societies. It needs to conduct broader and deeper diagnostic work, taking
into account the underlying cultural forces of endemic political intrusion in
the judiciary. This includes exploring and discovering the relationships
among these cultural factors, low levels of trust and poor judicial outcomes.
Reform efforts should place greater emphasis on societal values and
attitudes and less on new structures and operational capabilities.

171. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 161, at xxii–xxiii.
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This requires new approaches and a long-term effort and commitment.
It will likely demand intense and greater educational efforts to instill in
society, especially the younger generations, the values underpinning the
rule of law and judicial independence and impartiality and their
significance to a better society. In the long run, the fundamental willingness
to uphold and defend these values will likely be the strongest catalyst for
change. Cultural independence matters.
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APPENDIX 1: Table of Bank Stand-Alone Judicial Reform Projects172
Venezuela Judicial
Infrastructure
Project (1992)173

Approved: Aug. 1992
Closed: Oct. 2002

Project Cost:
US $60 million

Loan
Amount:
US $30
million

Improve Venezuela’s enabling environment for private
sector development and reduce both the private and social costs
of justice. It would: (a) improve efficiency in the allocation of
resources within the judiciary; (b) increase courtroom
productivity and efficiency; and (c) reduce
the private sector costs of dispute resolution.
Project
(a) Judicial administration (strengthen the planning, budgeting,
Components
and management capacity of the Judicial Council, including
the design and implementation of an information system to
provide quantifiable performance indicators)
(b) Courtroom administration (improve courtroom productivity
and efficiency through reorganization and streamlining
courtroom administrative procedures, including automation
of caseload and courtroom management)
(c) Judicial training (strengthen the administrative capacity and
specialized legal knowledge of court personnel, including
knowledge pertinent to commercial and business litigation,
by strengthening the capacity of the Judicial School to design
and deliver training)
(d) Physical infrastructure (rehabilitate existing and construct
new courtroom facilities)
Approved: April 1995
Bolivian Judicial
Project Cost:
Credit
Closed: March 2000
US $ 12.75
Reform Project
Amount:
(1995)174
million
US $11
million
Improve the quality and effectiveness of civil justice
Project
Development administration, strengthen the capacity of the Judiciary to provide
judicial services, and of the Ministry of Justice to prepare,
Objectives
review, and implement laws and programs related to the
country’s constitutional, judicial, economic, and social reforms.
Project
Development
Objectives

172. All of the figures and text herein are quoted/drawn from the respective Bank project
documents, including staff appraisal reports, project appraisal documents, implementation completion
reports and project performance assessment reports, and the World Bank, Initiatives in Justice Reform.
See, e.g., WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5.
173. Staff Appraisal Report: Venezuela 1992, supra note 28; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 86.
174. Staff Appraisal Report: Bolivia 1995, supra note 64; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE
REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 72.
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The Judiciary:

(a) Judicial process reforms (judicial process policies, training,
information systems and courtroom administration)

(b) Human resource management (judicial career system,
judicial training program, judicial ethics program)

(c) Institutional strengthening
(d) Judicial development fund
The Ministry of Justice:
(a) Implementation of Constitutional reforms on judicial matters
(b) Alternative dispute resolution
(c) Legislative reforms
(d) Institutional strengthening
Project Coordination Unit
Approved: July 1996
Ecuador Judicial
Closed: Nov. 2002
Reform Project
(1996)175

Project Cost:
US $12.12
million

Credit
Amount:
US $10.7
million
Improve the capacity of the judicial system by strengthening the
Project
administration of justice. Specifically, the proposed project aims
Development
at:
Objectives
(a) increasing efficiency, effectiveness and transparency in the
judicial process by improving case administration
procedures;
(b) improving the infrastructure;
(c) expanding the use of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms within the court system;
(d) improving the access to justice by the public and women in
particular; and
(e) improving court reform and research and legal education.
Project
(a) Case administration and information support
Components
(b) Alternative dispute resolution (mediation centers and
training)
(c) Program for law and justice (including support for civil
society activities, court innovation, a professional
development program, a legal education study, evaluation of
the mediation centers, and legal services for the poor)
(d) Remodeling and development of infrastructure
(e) Project coordination unit
Approved: June 1997
West Bank and
Project Cost:
Credit
Closed: June 2004
US $14.92
Gaza Legal
Amount:

175. Clustered PPAR 2010, supra note 70, at 7; Staff Appraisal Report: Ecuador 1996, supra note
106; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5.
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million
US $5.5
Development
Project (1997)176
million
Assist the Palestinian Authority in (a) starting the process of
Project
putting in place a legal framework adequate to support a modern
Development
market economy and encourage the growth of the private sector;
Objectives
and (b) increasing the efficiency and predictability of the judicial
process
Project
(a) Unification and development of legislation
Components
(b) Court administration
(c) Judicial training
(d) Alternative dispute resolution
(e) Legal information
Approved: Oct. 1997
Peru Judicial
Project Cost:
Loan
Cancelled: Sept. 1998
US $31.6 million Amount:
Reform Project
(1997)177
US $22.5
million
loan
Assist Peru in improving the performance of its justice system by
Project
enhancing, under the framework and terms of its sector strategy
Development
in the policy letter, its access, quality, independence, efficiency,
Objectives
and integrity. The specific objectives are to:
(a) modernize the administrative structure and operation of the
Judiciary;
(b) improve the overall performance in civil and labor courts in
the selected districts;
(c) strengthen the CNM and consolidate and improve its meritbased system of appointment, advancement and removal of
magistrates;
(d) strengthen the AM and enhance the professional competence
of civil and labor judges in the selected districts;
(e) strengthen OCMA’s disciplinary system to enhance
accountability and integrity of judges;
(f) develop and strengthen alternative dispute resolution
methods;
(g) support the institutional development of the newly
established Office of Public Defender; and
(h) strengthen the capacity of civil society to analyze, monitor
and demand judicial performance.
(a) Administration of justice (modernizing administrative
Project
apparatus of judiciary and courtroom performance
Components
improvements)

176. Implementation Completion Report: West Bank & Gaza 2004, supra note 144.
177. Staff Appraisal Report: Peru 1997, supra note 107; Project Completion Note: Peru 2000,
supra note 107.
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(b) Judicial selection, evaluation, and training
(c) Access to justice (justices of peace, public defender, civil
society)
(d) Project management and administration
Approved: Dec. 1997
Venezuela Supreme
Project Cost:
Loan
Closed: June 2001
US $7.3 million
Court
Amount:
US $4.7
Modernization
Project (1997)178
million
Improve the performance of the Supreme Court in terms of
Project
transparency, efficiency of administration and case management,
Development
and timeliness of decisions, through development of new work
Objectives
methods, attitudes, and behaviors that would have a
demonstration effect in leading further judicial reform.
(a) Capacity building in communications, policy research, and
Project
quality assurance
Components
(b) Caseload administration
(c) Supreme Court decisions’ dissemination
(e) Administration and management support
Approved: April 1998
Argentina Reform
Project cost:
Loan
Closed: Sept. 2005
US $6.95 million amount:
of Justice Project
(1999)179
US $5
million
Identify, establish, and evaluate conditions that support the
Project
realization of judicial administrative reform and form part of an
Development
overall legal and judicial reform program.
Objectives
(a) Court and case management in pilot courts (judicial
Project
administration and backlog delay reduction)
Components
(b) Training
(c) Evaluation and dissemination of information on pilot courts
(d) Project management
Approved: May 1999
Kazakhstan Legal
Project Cost:
Loan
Cancelled: Oct. 2003
US $18.5 million Amount:
Reform Project
(1999)180
US $16.5
million
Contribute to the strengthening of the implementation of the
Project
Rule of Law system in Kazakhstan. Specifically, the Project
Development
goals would be to strengthen the legal and judicial systems and
Objectives
selected institutions of the country in order to support and
178. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Learning and Innovation Loan in
the Amount of US $4.7 Million to the Republic of Venezuela for a Supreme Court Modernization
Project, Report No. 17212-VE (Dec. 9, 1997); WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009,
supra note 5, at 87.
179. Implementation Completion Report: Argentina 2006, supra note 144; WORLD BANK,
INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 70-71.
180. Project Appraisal Document: Kazakhstan 1999, supra note 80; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 60.
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deepen the ongoing economic reform program.
(a) Legal drafting and institutional strengthening
(b) Judicial strengthening (court administration/case
management and judicial training)
(c) Legal information and public awareness
(d) Project management and implementation
Approved: June 1999
Georgia Judicial
Project Cost:
Loan
Closed: June 2006
US $16.2 million Amount:
Reform Project
(1999)181
US $13.4
million
Assist in the development of an independent and professional
Project
judiciary, committed to high standards of judicial ethics and
Development
capable of efficient, effective dispute resolution.
Objectives
(a) Court administration and case management
Project
(b) Infrastructure rehabilitation
Components
(c) Enforcement of court judgments
(d) Assistance to the Ministry of Justice (legal drafting)
(e) Judicial training center
(f) Public information/education
(g) Project management
Approved: June 1999
Republic Of Yemen
Project Cost:
Credit
Closed: June 2003
US $2.94 million Amount:
Legal and Judicial
US $2.5
Reform Project
(1999)182
million
Assist the Government of the Republic of Yemen in piloting a
Project
program of judicial training to assess its potential to enhance the
Development
effectiveness of the judiciary, and to enhance the capabilities of
Objectives
its ministry of legal and parliamentary affairs to prepare and
advise on business and economic legislation outside of the court
system.
(a) Judicial development (training of judges and arbitrators and
Project
diagnostic assessments)
Components
(b) Legal development
(c) Public awareness campaign
Approved: Oct. 1999
Guatemala Judicial
Project Cost:
Loan
Closed: June 2007
US $49.7 million Amount:
Reform Project
(1999)183
US $33
million
Support the Guatemalan judiciary in implementing its
Project
Project
Components

181. Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 59.
182. Project Appraisal Document: Yemen 1999, supra note 123; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 95.
183. ICR: Guatemala 2008, supra note 106; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009,
supra note 5, at 79-80.
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modernization plan. The project aimed to improve the
administration of justice, strengthen judicial independence and
accountability, and increase access to justice and confidence in
the judicial system.
(a) Strengthening institutional capacity of the judiciary branch
Project
(b) Providing anticorruption support (ethical standards,
Components
training, anti-corruption commission, disciplinary
procedures)
(c) Strengthening access to justice (justices of peace, mediation
centers, mobile courts, service delivery, civil society
participation program)
(d) Social communications, modernization and project
management
Approved: March 2000
Albania Legal and
Project Cost: Loan
Closed: Dec. 2005
US $9.5
Judicial Reform
Amount:
Project (2000)184
million
US $9
million
Provide required resources for technical assistance, training,
Project
goods, and works that are needed to implement important aspects
Development
of the Government’s institutional agenda for legal and justice
Objectives
system reforms, thereby contributing to the strengthening of the
rule of law in Albania.
(a) Improve legal education
Project
(b) Strengthen the justice system (court administration, case
Components
management, judicial training, enforcement of judicial
decisions, judicial inspections)
(c) ADR mechanisms for commercial disputes
(d) Disseminate legal information
(e) Project management
Approved: May 2000
Sri Lanka Legal and
Project Cost: Loan
Closed: Feb. 2007
US $21.14
Judicial Reforms
Amount:
Project 185
million
US $18.2
million
Improve upon the existing legal and judicial framework by
Project
making it more efficient, transparent, and responsive to the needs
Development
of the public at large and of the private sector in particular. More
Objectives
specifically, the project seeks to: (a) modernize the legislative
framework that impacts private sector activity; (b) improve the
administration, monitoring, and regulatory functions of the
Company Registry; and (c) build capacity of the judiciary and
other institutions providing dispute resolution services.
Development
Objectives

184. Project Appraisal Document: Albania 2000, supra note 90; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 52.
185. Project Appraisal Document: Sri Lanka 2000, supra note 105; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 102.
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(a) Legal reform
(b) Company registry improvements
(c) Judicial reform (judicial education and training,
administrative reorganizing, model courts, mediation center
for commercial disputes)
(d) Project management
Approved: June 2000
Morocco Legal and
Project Cost: Loan
Closed: June 2004
US $12.2
Judicial Development
Amount:
Project (2000)186
million
US $11.4
million
Improve the Moroccan capacity to resolve commercial disputes
Project
and to facilitate commercial transactions within the country.
Development
Objectives
(a) Legal and regulatory framework
Project
(b) Case management and automation of commercial courts
Components
(c) Registries of commerce improvements
(d) Judicial training
(e) Capacity building of Ministry of Justice in communications
and information
(f) Project Implementation Unit
Approved: Sept. 2000
Armenia Judicial
Project Cost: Loan
Closed: Dec. 2006
US $6.73
Reform Project
Amount:
(2000)187
million
US $5.3
million
Assist in the development of an independent, accessible, and
Project
efficient judiciary in the Republic of Armenia, which is essential
Development
to governance, rule of law, and investment climate.
Objectives
More specifically, the project aims at:
(a) strengthening judicial self-governance through support to
the Council of Court Chairmen (CCC);
(b) improvement of court administration and case management
procedures;
(c) development of a comprehensive institutional base for
continuing education for judges and court personnel;
(d) strengthening the service for enforcement of court decisions;
(e) development of a comprehensive legal information system
accessible to judges, legal professionals, business
community and citizens; and
(f) promotion of public awareness of laws and legal institutions.
(a) Strengthening institutional capacity of the judiciary
Project
(Judicial governance, court administration, case
Components
Project
Components

186. Project Appraisal Document: Morocco 2000, supra note 110; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 93.
187. Project Appraisal Document: Armenia 2000, supra note 111; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 53-54.
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management, court automation)
(b) Court infrastructure réhabilitation
(c) Training of judges and court personnel
(d) Improving enforcement of court decisions
(e) Dissemination of legal information
(f) Public awareness and public education
(g) Project management
Approved: March 2001
Bangladesh Legal and
Project Cost: Credit
Closed: Dec. 2008
US $43.63
Judicial Capacity
Amount:
million
US $30.6
Building Project
(2001)188
million
Improve the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the
Project
civil justice delivery system, and increase access to justice,
Development
particularly for women and the poor.
Objectives
(a) Judicial capacity building (court administration, case
Project
management, information systems, training, upgrading of
Components
court infrastructure)
(b) Improving access to justice and promoting legal literacy
and public awareness (gender sensitivity, ADR
mechanisms, small case courts, legal aid, public awareness
at grassroots and national level, bar association)
(c) Legal reform capacity building (law commission, ministry
of justice)
(d) Preparation for future reforms
(e) Project implementation and related services
Approved: June 2006
Azerbaijan Judicial
Project Cost: Credit
US $35.60
Modernization Project Closing Date: Dec. 2011
Amount:
(2006)189
million
US $21.6
million
Assist the Azerbaijan authorities in developing, and
Project
implementing the initial phases of a long-term judicial system
Development
modernization program by building capacity to achieve
Objectives
incremental improvements in efficiency, citizen information, and
its ability to handle future demand.
(a) Strengthening the management capacity of judicial
Project
institutions
Components
(b) Upgrading court facilities
(c) Human capital - strengthening professionalism of judges
and staff
(d) Improving citizen information, including strengthening of
registries and notaries

188. Project Appraisal Document: Bangladesh 2001, supra note 73; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 98-99.
189. Project Appraisal Document: Azerbaijan 2006, supra note 122; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES
IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 55.
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Approved: June 2001
Croatia Court and
Project Cost: Loan
Closed: Jan. 2007
US $6.95
Bankruptcy
Amount:
million
US $5
Administration Project
(2001)190
million
Assist the Government of Croatia in advancing orderly
Project
insolvency proceedings while modernizing selected commercial
Development
courts and increasing professionalism and competence of judges,
Objectives
other staff of the commercial courts and bankruptcy trustees.
(a) Commercial court administration and case management
Project
model
Components
(b) Legal information system
(c) Regulatory framework for trustees and administrators
(d) Upgrading skills of bankruptcy professionals
(e) Insolvency and legal services framework
(f) Project management
Approved: Nov. 2001
Colombia Judicial
Project Cost: Loan
Closed: June 2006
US $6.66
Conflict Resolution
Amount:
million
US $5
Improvement Project
(2001)191
million
To test a participatory and comprehensive organizational change
Project
strategy aimed at tackling the key levers of the courts’
Development
organizational structure leading to improvements in the
Objectives
judiciary’s timeliness, quality and productivity in discharging its
conflict resolution function.
(a) Culture change
Project
(b) Human resources competence and capabilities
Components
(c) Organizational structure
(d) Information systems
(e) Court facilities
(f) Communication and participation
(g) Performance evaluation and rewards
(h) Project management, monitoring, and evaluation
Approved: Dec. 2001
Mongolia Legal and
Project Cost: Credit
Closed: April 2008
US $5.55
Judicial Reform
Amount:
Project (2001)192
million
US $5
million
Enhance public trust and confidence in the legal system as a
Project
whole and the judiciary in particular through the design and
Development
190. Project Appraisal Document: Croatia 2001, supra note 106; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 57-58.
191. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Learning and Innovation Loan in
the Amount of US$5 Million to the Republic of Colombia for a Judicial Conflict Resolution
Improvement Project, Report No. 23184-CO (Nov. 8, 2001); Clustered PPAR 2010, supra note 70, at
13; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 75.
192. Project Appraisal Document: Mongolia 2001, supra note 105; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 46.
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testing of new tools and systems that promote better access to
legal information, the creation of specialized courts and an
improved legal education and profession.
(a) Development of an administrative court system to promote
Project
transparency and governance (communication awareness
Components
campaign for the administrative court system, training of
administrative judges and court personnel, infrastructure for
the pilot administrative courts, new court management and
case administration techniques for pilot courts)
(b) Knowledge sharing and capacity building to foster access
to justice (comprehensive public awareness activities and
dissemination of legal and judicial information, electronic
legal and judicial database, physical infrastructure for the
National Center for Legal and Judicial Information,
Research and Training, staff training, equipment and
computers.)
(c) Enhancing the legal education and legal profession to
provide market based solutions for better delivery of
Services (training for trainers, development of techniques
to monitor the effectiveness of legal education quality
assessment, improve the legal profession)
(d) Project unit support
Approved: March 2004
El Salvador Judicial
Project Cost: Loan
US $ 23.87 Amount:
Modernization Project Closed: June 2010
(2002)193
million US $18.2
Improve El Salvador’s judicial system by promoting measures
Project
aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, accessibility and
Development
credibility of its Judicial Branch, through a participatory process
Objectives
involving judges, technical and administrative staff and users of
the judicial system. Specifically the project would:
(1) strengthen the institutional management capacity of the
Judicial Branch;
(2) modernize the court system;
(3) provide knowledge sharing to foster access to justice and
transparency;
(4) develop the professional competence and quality of officers
and employees of the Judicial Branch; and
(5) support Project management, monitoring and evaluation.
Project
(a) Strengthening of the institutional management capacity of
Components
the Judicial Branch (developing administrative quality
standards; designing an integrated planning system, and
developing an international grant resource management
program)
Objectives

193. Project Appraisal Document: El Salvador 2002, supra note 105; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES
supra note 5, at 78.
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(b) Court system modernization (developing a court remapping
plan, strengthening of the automated judicial and
administrative case management program, updating models
of judicial organization, and expanding judicial
infrastructure)
(c) Knowledge sharing to foster access to justice and
transparency (designing a system for inspection and control
of judicial services, carrying out legal outreach programs
aimed at civil society groups, and up-grading judicial
documentation centers and libraries)
(d) Development of the professional quality and competence of
judicial officers and employees (improving the Judicial
branch’s human resources policies and promoting the role of
judges in El Salvador’s economic and social development)
(e) Project management, monitoring and evaluation
Approved: Aug. 2003
Philippines Judicial
Project Cost: Loan
Closed: Dec. 2009
US $24.42
Reform Support
Amount:
Project (2003)194
million
US $21.9
million
Support the development of a more effective and accessible
Project
judicial system that would foster public trust and confidence.
Development
Specifically, the Project will assist in:
Objectives
(a) Ensuring speedy and fair dispensation of justice to all by
improving the efficiency of case adjudication and access to
justice
(b) Upgrading the integrity of the judiciary
(c) Strengthening institutional capabilities
(d) Promoting stakeholder support for reform of the judiciary
Project
(a) Strengthening case adjudication and access to justice (case
Components
management system, court records management system,
computer-aided transcription technology, court jurisdictional
structure, policy development on affordability constraints to
access to the court system by the poor, mobile courts,
information and communications technology)
(b) Enhancing institutional integrity (code of ethics, alternative
feedback mechanisms on judicial performance,
computerized judicial performance management system,
professional development for excellence)
(c) Strengthening institutional capacity of the judiciary
(Decentralizing administrative functions, financial
management systems, court infrastructure, electronic
judicial library and research facilities)

194. Project Appraisal Document: Philippines 2003, supra note 134; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES
supra note 5, at 47-48.
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(d) Stakeholder support for reform and program
Approved: July 2004
Mexico State Judicial
Project Cost:
US $37.5
Modernization Project Closing Date: Dec. 2011
(2004)195
million

Loan
Amount:
US $30
million
Support the improvement of institutional performance of
Project
judiciaries in a few states through a credit program of the
Development
National Bank of Works and Public Services (BANOBRA) for
Objectives
state judicial modernization.
(a) Strengthen institutional capabilities, organizational culture
Project
and knowledge (specialized studies, strategic planning,
Components
performance evaluation system, change management,
knowledge sharing)
(b) Improve efficiency and effectiveness of judicial services
(organizational and management models, case backlog
reduction, case distribution, professional development and
career systems, integrated management systems, training,
research, infrastructure)
(c) Increase judicial transparency (information and
communication mechanisms, disciplinary and
accountability systems, public awareness)
(d) Strengthen access to justice for all users (outreach to
special and disadvantaged groups, ADR mechanisms, small
claims courts, public defender, legal aid, infrastructure, bar
associations)
(e) Support Project coordination, monitoring and evaluation,
and learning, including consultation with Project
stakeholders
Approved: April 2005
Peru Justice Services
Project Cost: Loan
US $15
Modernization Project Closed: March 2010
Amount:
(2005)196
million
US $12
million
Set the foundation for a long term, participatory, and sustainable
Project
reform process for Peru’s justice sector. Specific objectives will
Development
be: (a) to strengthen institutional capacity to lead the reform
Objectives
process and achieve specific improvements in justice services
delivery, in particular in the Judiciary and in selected project

195. Project Appraisal Document: Mexico 2004, supra note 121; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 81; World Bank, Project Paper on Restructuring the Mexico:
State Judicial Modernization Supporting Access to Justice Project, at 3, Report No. 48695 (July 10,
2008) (extending the closing date to December, 2011).
196. Project Appraisal Document: Peru 2004, supra note 74 ; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 82; Justice Services Improvement Peru, Project ID P073438,
Project-at-a-Glance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/external/
projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P0
73438 (last updated Feb. 17, 2004).
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districts; (b) to establish human resource management systems
that ensure independence, transparency and integrity; and (c) to
enhance access to justice services for the Peruvian society, in
particular the poor.
Project
(a) Improved justice services delivery (planning and
Components
management, court administration, court operations)
(b) Judicial human resources professional development
(judicial selection and evaluation, training, human resources
management)
(c) Access to justice (accountability and integrity, legal aid,
ADR mechanisms, other pro-poor services, public outreach)
(d) Project management, coordination, and monitoring
assistance
Approved: July 2005
Honduras Judicial
Project Cost: Loan
US $15
Branch Modernization Closing Date: June 2011
Amount:
Project (2005)197
million
US $12
million
Support implementation of the Judicial Branch Modernization
Project
Plan 2004-2009. The project aims to improve the capacity and
Development
performance of the Judicial Branch in three areas: (a) greater
Objectives
efficiency of case processing, judgments and appeals; (b)
enhanced transparency and accountability; and (c) better access
to justice, especially for the most disadvantaged groups.
(a) Improvement of the efficiency of judicial services
Project
(streamlined judicial processes, management systems)
Components
(b) Enhancing judicial accountability and transparency
(judicial career systems, training, institutional performance
monitoring and auditing, information dissemination)
(c) Promoting equitable access to justice (ADR mechanisms,
public awareness, public defender)
(d) Project coordination, monitoring, and evaluation
Approved: Nov. 2005
Romania Judicial
Project Cost: Loan
Closing Date: March
US $171.86
Reform Project
Amount:
(2005)198
2013
million
US $130
million
Increase efficiency of the Romanian courts and improve
Project
197. Project Appraisal Document: Honduras 2005, supra note 122; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 80; Judicial Branch Modernization Honduras, Project ID
P081516, Project-at-a-Glance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank.
org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&P
rojectid=P081516 (last updated June 20, 2005).
198. Project Appraisal Document: Romania 2005, supra note 120; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 64; Judicial Reform Romania, Project ID P090309, Project-ata-Glance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/
main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P090309
(last updated Oct. 7, 2010).
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accountability of the judiciary which should result in reduced
corruption and more transparent act of justice.
(a) Court infrastructure rehabilitation
(b) Strengthening the administrative capacity of courts (case
management, court administration)
(c) Integrated resource management system for the judiciary
(d) Institutional development of judicial institutions (policy
development, communications, judicial administration,
judicial selection, promotion and training, technology)
Approved: Feb. 2006
Sudan Capacity
Project Cost: Grant
Closed: June 2009
US $18
Building of the
Amount:
million
US $13
National Judiciary
(2006)199
million
Strengthen the capacity of the Judiciary to enhance its
Project
independence, build the knowledge base of judges, and empower
Development
the judiciary to effectively and fairly apply the law and deliver
Objectives
justice
(a) Support for the National Judicial Service Commission
Project
(NJSC)
Components
(b) Judicial training
(c) Establishment of the National Legal Resource and Training
Center and rehabilitation of the Judiciary’s existing
training facility
(d) Rehabilitation of selected court facilities
Approved: June 2006
Macedonia Legal and
Project Cost: Loan
Closing Date: March
US $14.7
Judicial
Amount:
2012
million
US $12.4
Implementation and
million
Institutional Support
Project (2006)200
Contribute to improving judicial efficiency and effectiveness and
Project
the business climate in FYR Macedonia by:
Development
(i) enhancing ministerial and judicial capacity to systemically
Objectives
implement the Government’s Judicial Reform Strategy and key
laws; and (ii) improving judicial infrastructure.
(a) Ministerial and judicial capacity building (improving the
Project
quality of judicial management of the judiciary,
Components
administrative inspections and administrative dispute
resolution, improving bankruptcy administration and
ministry of economy supervision)
Development
Objectives
Project
Components

199. 2006 Sudan Capacity, supra note 126; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009,
supra note 5, at 32.
200. Project Appraisal Document: Macedonia 2006, supra note 121; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES
IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 63; Legal & Judicial Implementation & Institutional Support
Project Macedonia, Project ID P089859, Project-at-a-Glance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS &
OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230& the
SitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P089859 (last updated Nov. 10, 2010).
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(b) Improving judicial infrastructure
(c) Enhancing judicial information technology systems
(d) Project implementation
Sudan Southern Sudan Approved: March 2007
Project Cost: Grant
Closed: Dec. 2009
US $45
Justice Support
Amount:
Project (2006)201
million
US $ 5.3
million
Develop the capacity of the Police and Prison Services to
Project
deliver professional services is substantially increased across
Development
Southern Sudan.
Objectives
(a) Infrastructure
Project
(b) Institutional development
Components
(c) Training
(d) Inmate care and treatment
(e) Project management
Approved: Feb. 2007
Russian Federation
Project Cost: Loan
Closing Date: March
US $172.41
Judicial Reform
Amount:
2012
million
US $50
Support Project
(2007)202
million
Strengthen judicial transparency and efficiency in courts
Project
financed by the JRSP.
Development
Objectives
(a) Institutionalizing judicial transparency and accountability
Project
(user surveys, publicity of judicial decisions, case
Components
management, judicial effectiveness assessment,
communications and change management)
(b) Harnessing ICT for judicial transparency and effectiveness
(Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, CGJ and Judicial
Department, Supreme Arbitration Court)
(c) Strengthening human capital (workshops, knowledge
sharing, IT-related training)
(d) Project management, monitoring, and evaluation
Approved: March 2007
Armenia Second
Project Cost: Credit
Closing Date: Dec. 2012
US $32.69
Judicial Reform
Amount:
Project (2007)203
million
US $22.5
million
Provide Armenia’s judiciary with the administration, facilities
Project
and expanded capacity necessary to improve the efficiency,
Development

201. World Bank, Sudan Multi Donor Trust Fund, Final Project Proposal, Police and Prison
Support Project, Juba (Oct. 2006); WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5,
at 33.
202. Project Appraisal Document: Russia 2007, supra note 121; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 65-66.
203. Project Appraisal Document: Armenia 2007, supra note 115; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 54.
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reliability and transparency of judicial operations and services;
and continue to improve public awareness of judicial services
and access to legal and judicial information.
Project
(a) Strengthening judicial governance and administration
Components
(capacity building of reformed Council of Justice, new
Judicial Department, rollout of the court administration and
case management system)
(b) Courthouse rehabilitation
(c) Judicial training school
(d) Improving enforcement of judicial decisions
(e) Strengthening arbitration services
(f) Expanding access to legal information and public
awareness
(g) Project management
Approved: May 2008
Afghanistan Judicial
Project Cost: Grant
US $27.75
Sector Reform Project Closing Date: June 2011
Amount:
(2008)204
million
US
$27.75
million
To strengthen the centralized state justice system in Afghanistan
Project
and increase access to justice for the Afghan people.
Development
Objectives
(a) Strengthening capacity of legal institutions to deliver legal
Project
services (human resources management, infrastructure,
Components
information and communication technology)
(b) Empowering the people (legal aid, legal awareness
campaign)
Approved: June 2008
Mongolia Enhanced
Project Cost: Credit
Closing Date: Dec. 2012
US $6.95
Justice Services
Amount:
Project (2008)205
million
US $5
million
Support Mongolian justice sector institutions enhance their
Project
efficiency, transparency and accountability through capacity
Development
improvements.
Objectives
(a) Enhancing public legal education on the justice sector
Project
(b) Increasing transparency through improved access to legal
Components
information
(c) Enhancing judicial operations, enforcement and
Objectives

204. World Bank, Implementation Status and Results, Afghanistan Judicial Reform Project, Report
No. ISR3408 (June 14, 2011); WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at
98.
205. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 2.07
Million (US 3.7 Million Equivalent) and a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 1.03 Million (US$ 1.3
Million Equivalent) to Mongolia for a Enhanced Justice Sector Services Project, Report No. 44059MN, (June 6, 2008); WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 45-46.
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monitoring of court decisions
(d) Project management
Approved: Dec. 2008
Serbia Justice Sector
Closing Date: Dec. 2011
Support Project
(2008)206

237

Project Cost:
US $4.7
million

Loan
Amount:
US $4.0
million
Facilitation of the acceleration of Serbia’s European Union
Project
integration process pertaining to the justice sector.
Development
This will be done by supporting (i) strengthening institutional
Objectives
capacity; (ii) the improvement of justice sector performance and
(iii) increased aid effectiveness.
(a) Institutional capacity ( facilitate capacity-building in the
Project
MOJ, judiciary and the MOF to design, coordinate and
Components
implement judicial reform and modernization programs)
(b) Resource management and aid coordination (facilitate the
justice sector leadership to strengthen justice sector
resource management and aid coordination)
(c) Legal and institutional environment (facilitate the
strengthening of the legal and institutional environment for
the judiciary)
(d) Judicial facilities and infrastructure
(e) Outreach, monitoring and evaluation
Approved: Dec. 2009
Colombia Justice
Project
Loan
Services Strengthening Closing Date: Dec. 2013
Cost:
Amount:
Project (2009)207
US $20
US $20
million
million
Strengthen the capacity of the Judiciary and the Ministry of
Project
Interior and Justice to deliver timely, efficient, effective and
Development
quality dispute resolution services to citizens
Objectives
(a) Efficient management of justice services (management and
Project
communications systems)
Components
(b) Development of judicial human resources (training,
performance evaluation systems)
(c) Facilitating access to justice services (justice services map,
justice services survey, decentralization, ADR mechanisms)
(d) Project coordination

206. World Bank, Republic of Serbia, Multi Donor Trust Fund for Justice Sector Support Project,
Report No. TF071171 (Dec. 1, 2008); WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note
5, at 67; Serbia Justice Sector Support Multi Donor Trust Fund, Project ID P121377, Project-at-aGlance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/
main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P121377
(last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
207. Project Appraisal Document: Colombia 2009, supra note 159; Justice Services Strengthening
Colombia, Project ID P083904, Project-at-a-Glance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS,
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941
&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P083904 (last updated Dec. 1, 2009).
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Croatia Justice Center
Support Project208
Project
Development
Objectives
Project
Components

Approved: April 2010
Closing Date: June 2015

Project
Cost:
US $37.84
million
Improve the efficiency of Croatia’s justice system.

[Vol 22:183

Loan
Amount:
US $36.3
million

(a) Improving the efficiency of the court system (infrastructure,
management capacity building, information technology,
performance evaluation, case management, enforcement of
judicial decisions)
(b) Improving the efficiency of the state attorney’s office
(infrastructure, capacity building, case management and
information technology)
(c) Strengthening the efficiency of the Ministry of Justice’s
management functions
(d) Support for project management and implementation
Approved: Nov. 2010
Peru Justice Services
Project Cost: Loan
Closing Date: Sept. 2015
US $30
Improvement Project
Amount:
II (2010)209
million
US $20
million
Improve the quality of service delivery by the Participating
Project
Institutions and to enhance access to justice with a focus on
Development
citizens’ needs for justice services.
Objectives
(a) Improved justice services delivery (planning and
Project
management, case management)
Components
(b) Improved human resources management capacity
(c) Enhanced transparency and access to justice (disciplinary
capacity, communications strategy, legal aid, public legal
education)
(d) Project management, monitoring, and evaluation

208. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of EUR 26
Million (US $36.3 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Croatia for a Justice Sector Support Project,
Report No. 51133-HR (March 3, 2010); Justice Sector Support Project Croatia, Project ID: P104749,
Project-at-a-Glance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/external/
projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P1
04749 (last updated Mar. 15, 2010).
209. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Technical Assistance Loan in the
Amount of US$20 Million to the Republic of Peru for a Justice Services Improvement Project II, Report
No. 56576-PE (Oct. 20, 2010); Justice Services Improvement Project II Peru, Project ID: P110752,
Project-at-a-Glance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/external/
projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P1
10752 (last updated Feb. 3, 2011).

